Shiva From Afar

Devora Steinmetz

An hour or so after my mother died, I was sitting in her hospital room, not far from her bed, talking on the phone with my sister in Israel. The next day would be Friday, the day before a “three day Yom Tov,” Shabbat followed by Shavuot, and so it was important that the burial take place the next day. And I wanted to make sure that the funeral service, to be held on Zoom, would be scheduled at a time when my sister would be able to participate, before the start of Shabbat in Israel. As I was discussing these constraints with my sister, she suddenly said: “I have to run to ma’ariv now. We can talk later.” “Ma’ariv? You’re in aninut!”^[1] “No,” she said. “I started shiva already, and I have to run to say kaddish.”

My sister was following her community’s practice in beginning shiva immediately upon hearing of our mother’s death and, when I mentioned this to one of the rabbis in my community, they affirmed this practice: “That is what people do; that is the halakhah.” The practice did not make sense to me at the time, and I want to argue here for a re-evaluation of the practice in light of an examination of the relevant sources as well as of changes that have taken place in communication – and, in particular, with the popularization of Zoom and similar platforms since the onset of the Covid pandemic.

     I.      Aninut

It might seem intuitive that shiva begins when aninut ends and that, in the absence of the status of aninut, shiva begins immediately. In fact, this is not the case; there are a number of situations in which the practices of aninut do not apply and yet shiva does not begin. In addition, it is important to note, there are situations in which it’s not clear whether a person who has recently lost their relative has the status of an onein, and about which there are long-standing disputes that manifest in varying practices. In this section, we’ll look briefly at the question of when aninut practices apply and then note examples of situations in which a person would not be subject to aninut practices and yet would not yet begin shiva. In the next section, we’ll look at what does trigger the beginning of shiva and, in the final section, we’ll consider how the sources concerning this might relate to the case that I introduced.

               a. The Basis of Aninut

The core texts concerning the restrictions of aninut are Mishnah Berakhot 3:1 and the passages in the Bavli and Yerushalmi that discuss this mishnah. The mishnah teaches that one whose dead [relative] is mutal le-fanav is exempt from the performance of [positive] mitzvot. A baraita in Berakhot 17b adds that the person is forbidden to eat meat and drink wine. In discussing the baraita, the Gemara clarifies that these exemptions and prohibitions apply to a person even if they are not actually in the presence of their dead relative – that is, even if the dead relative is not literally mutal le-fanav – as long as the person is responsible for burying their relative: “since it is placed upon him (mutal alav) to bury him, it is as if the person is placed before him (mutal le-fanav)” (Berakhot 18a).

The Yerushalmi adds that the person is not only exempt from mitzvot but is actually not permitted to do mitzvot, and it offers two different explanations for why this is so: on account of the honor of the dead, or because the living relative has no one else to bear their burden (y. Berakhot 3:1). The Yerushalmi notes a nafka minah (practical difference) between these two explanations: If one does have someone else to take care of burial arrangements, then, according to the second explanation, the exemption from mitzvot would not apply. But, according to the first explanation, that desisting from performing mitzvot is for the honor of the dead, the exemption – and according to the Yerushalmi, prohibition – would still apply.

In addition, the Yerushalmi offers a teaching of R. Bun that might be seen as offering a third explanation for the exemption from mitzvot (though not necessarily for a prohibition to perform mitzvot): “It is written: ‘In order that you remember the day of your leaving Egypt all the days of your life’ – the days in which you are occupied with the living, and not the days in which you are occupied with the dead.”^[2] This explanation seems to focus not on the dead person – neither on their honor nor on the need to be freed from other responsibilities in order to attend to their burial – but on the living relative, on an essential contradiction between the performance of mitzvot as expressing and emanating from engagement in life^[3] and the state of a person who is experiencing the very recent loss of a relative.^[4] According to this explanation, such a person would likely be exempt from mitzvot whether or not they are occupied with burial arrangements for their dead relative.

               b. Is There Aninut When the Relative Is Not Occupied With Burial Arrangements?

A story told about Rabbeinu Tam serves as the locus for a debate among the poskim (halakhic decisors) as to whether or not a person is subject to the rules of aninut when they are not occupied with burial arrangements for their dead relative. Tosafot report that when Rabbeinu Tam was informed after Shabbat that his sister, who lived in a different town, had died, Rabbeinu Tam ate meat and drank wine, explaining that, since his sister had a husband who was responsible for her burial, the prohibition of meat and wine does not apply to him, her brother.^[5]

 The specific criteria that generated Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling, as well as the ruling itself, are discussed and disputed by poskim and commentaries. Would Rabbeinu Tam have adopted this practice had he been in the same town as his sister, or was the fact that he was in a different town a factor in his decision?^[6] Would Rabbeinu Tam have adopted this practice had it been a different relative who had died, or was his decision specific to having lost his sister? – a sister, after all, might be seen to become a part of her husband’s family after marriage, and, in fact, a kohein is permitted to become impure only for his deceased unmarried sister, not for his married sister.^[7]

Whatever the specific circumstances, Rabbeinu Tam’s practice is strongly rejected by Rosh, who rules that all relatives are obligated in the laws of aninut, whether or not a different relative is responsible for burial arrangements and whether or not the person is in the same town as the deceased.^[8] Rosh’s position is codified in Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh Dei’ah 341:1). Whether aninut practices apply to a person who is out of town and not occupied with burial arrangements for their recently-deceased relative has continued to be subject to different opinions and practices until today.^[9]

Another source relevant to the question of aninut practices when a relative is not occupied with burial arrangements appears in the Yerushalmi (y. Berakhot 3:1/6a; y. Mo’eid Katan 3:5/82b) and is quoted in the same Tosafot in which the anecdote about Rabbeinu Tam appears: “If [the dead person] is handed over to the public, [the relative] eats meat and drinks wine; one who is handed over to the carriers (nimsar le-katafim) is like one who is handed over to the public.” This ruling is codified in Shulhan Arukh: “In a place where it is the practice that there are specified carriers to carry out the dead, and after the relatives deal with the burial needs they hand him to them and they bury him, once they hand him to them the relatives are permitted to have meat and wine, even before they remove him from the house, because he is no longer thrust upon them (mutal aleihem)” (Yoreh Dei’ah 341:3).

Some halakhists understand the Yerushalmi’s ruling to suggest that anytime one is not occupied with burial arrangements one is not subject to the laws of aninut, which would correlate with Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling. But Shulhan Arukh clearly distinguishes between the Yerushalmi’s case of nimsar le-katafim and a situation such as Rabbeinu Tam’s, since Shulhan Arukh rules, against Rabbeinu Tam, that aninut practices apply even if the relative is in a different town and even if the relative does not need to deal with the needs of the dead person (Yoreh Dei’ah 341:1).^[10] Perhaps Shulhan Arukh is assuming that the relatives who hand the dead person over to the katafim will not be continuing on to the burial,^[11] and so, although aveilut doesn’t begin yet (see the discussion below), the status of aninut no longer applies. Or, perhaps Shulhan Arukh assumes that a relative will always have the status of an onein for at least some period of time and so, in a case such as Rabbeinu Tam’s, all relatives will be subject to the rules of aninut whether or not they are in town and whether or not they are the ones responsible to take care of burial arrangements. But, once aninut has begun and burial arrangements have been made, and others – the katafim – havebeen engaged to take care of the burial, the rules of aninut cease to apply, even if the relatives will be present at the burial.^[12]

The case of nimsar le-katafim has generated significant discussion in relation to the nearly universal practice in Jewish communities of having a hevrah kadisha, a burial society whose task it is to tend to the body from shortly after death through burial. Does the fact that the hevrah kadisha tends to all of these needs mean that no one is subject to the rules of aninut anymore, at least once the hevrah kadisha has been called and takes charge of the body? Rabbi David Brofsky, in his recent book Hilkhot Avelut, discusses this question and cites the relevant halakhic literature,^[13] and there is no need to review the different opinions here. I do, however, want to raise an important consideration in regard to this question, one that will be relevant to the discussion of the core question that I am seeking to address in this essay.

When one imagines a small town in an era before modern modes of communication, it would seem that, once the hevrah kadisha took charge of the deceased person, there really wasn’t much left for the relatives to do in anticipation of the burial. Nowadays, of course, the situation is quite different. Relatives are often engaged in a variety of tasks – calling other relatives and friends, making sure that the death and plans for the funeral are posted on a variety of email lists, arranging flights for relatives who are out of town or overseas, deciding on the program for the funeral service, and perhaps working on their own hespeid (eulogy) to be delivered at the funeral. In pre-modern times, few of these tasks would have been relevant.^[14] And so, even if one would in theory adopt the Yerushalmi’s ruling about the case of nimsar le-katafim and apply it to the hevrah kadisha, it is hard to imagine nowadays a situation in which relatives are not actively engaged in tzorkhei ha-meit, the needs of the dead, up until the time of burial. This is certainly the case for relatives who are in town, and likely the case as well for relatives who are out of town, who might be engaged in efforts to get to the funeral, or who are working on communicating news of the death and plans for the funeral, or writing a eulogy to be delivered at the funeral or to be read on their behalf if they are unable to be there in person. In short, it would seem that, even if we accept the Yerushalmi’s teaching at face value, and even if we accept Rabbeinu Tam’s position (contra Shulhan Arukh), most relatives nowadays would be under the framework of osekim be-tzorkhei ha-meit – being occupied with the needs of the dead – even if they are not directly involved in bringing the person to burial.^[15]

               c. The Disjunction Between Aninut and Aveilut

There are, though, situations in which poskim agree that the rules of aninut would not apply at all to the relatives of someone who has died. A classic case that is brought by several Rishonim is tragically relevant to our contemporary situation in the aftermath of October 7^th: a person whose body is being held by a power that refuses to release it for burial. If the family has not given up hope of retrieving the body, then the codified ruling is that aninut does not apply even though shiva does not yet begin.^[16] Similarly, if there is a delay in the ability of the family to bring their relative to burial, aninut practices would not apply and shiva would begin only when the burial takes place.^[17] What I want to emphasize at this point is not the specific criteria that determine whether or not aninut applies in such difficult and complex situations, but rather the fact that such cases reveal a disjunction between aninut and aveilut. That is, even when aninut does not apply, this does not mean that the relative has become an aveil. Indeed, in Rabbeinu Tam’s case as well, the practice that was reported was that he did not take on the restrictions of aninut; there is no suggestion that he became an aveil immediately upon hearing the news of his sister’s death.^[18]

And so, if what triggers the onset of aveilut is not the termination of aninut or, in the absence of aninut, the death itself, then what is it that initiates the status of aveilut?

     II.      Aveilut

When individuals are tending to their recently-deceased relative, the moment of the onset of aveilut is straightforward. “When does aveilut begin? At the sealing of the goleil” (Mo’eid Katan 27a; Sanhedrin 47b). Rashi understands the sealing of the goleil to refer to the closing of the aron (coffin) with its cover,^[19] while Rabbeinu Tam understands it as completing the burial, signified by marking the grave with a stone or other marker.^[20] These interpretations represent two different stages of leave-taking from one’s relative: the moment from which one will never see them again, and the moment at which their body is no longer on this earth and at which the relatives leave the body behind. The latter position, that aveilut begins at the completion of burial, is codified in Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh Dei’ah 375:1).

But the Talmud also discusses a situation in which relatives are not accompanying the deceased person to burial. “Rava said to the inhabitants of Mehoza: You who do not walk after the bier, when you turn your faces from the gate of the city, begin to count [shiva]” (Mo’eid Katan 22a). Since this instruction relates to a situation in which relatives will not be at the burial, possibly specifically to a situation in which the burial will take place at a significant distance from the location of the relatives, this passage is generally seen as suggesting a simple answer to the question with which I began: When should aveilut begin for relatives who live in a different location from where the person has died and will be buried and who will not be present at the burial?

A closer look, though, suggests a number of considerations that distinguish our case from the situation about which Rava instructs the townspeople of Mehoza. Before returning to our case, let’s look at the specific characteristics of the situation that Rava is addressing and which of these might be criteria that are salient to his ruling.

               a. Distance and Knowing When the Burial Will Take Place

To where are the people of Mehoza sending their dead for burial? Rava’s instructions talk about turning back at the city gates, so clearly the burial is taking place outside of the city. According to the mefareish and Rashi,^[21] the dead are being brought to the land of Israel for burial, a significant journey from Babylonia. If we assume that this is the case, would the same ruling apply if the burial is taking place closer to where the relatives are, as long as the relatives are not accompanying the deceased person to the burial place?

Rambam assumes that the ruling applies only if the burial is taking place at a significant distance from the relatives: “Those whose way it is to send the dead to a different city (medinah)^[22] to bury him and do not know when he will be buried – from the time that they turn away from accompanying him they begin to count shiva and sheloshim and begin to mourn” (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Eivel 1:5). Rambam seems to suggest that the reason the relatives do not wait to begin mourning is that they do not know when the burial will take place, or at least that not knowing when the burial will take place is one necessary criterion for beginning shiva right away.^[23] If they do know when the burial will take place – for example, if the burial is taking place just a short distance away from the relatives, in the same town – they would wait until after the burial to begin shiva.^[24] Other poskim do not distinguish between whether the burial is at a significant distance or relatively nearby; they assume that Rava’s ruling would apply as long as the relatives do not accompany the deceased person to burial.^[25]

Why might distance from the place of burial, or not knowing when the burial will take place, make a difference as to when shiva begins? One possibility is that this is simply a technical matter: since the person does not know when their relative will be buried, there is no specific time at which they would know that shiva should begin, and so they have no choice but to begin shiva immediately upon parting from their deceased relative.^[26] Alternatively, and more likely,^[27] knowing or not knowing when the person is to be buried might be understood to make a substantive difference in the consciousness of the bereaved relative. Ramban explains this in the following way: If the person is being sent far away for burial, then when the relatives turn back from accompanying the deceased person they have shifted their attention from him,^[28] and that is like setimat ha-goleil. If, on the other hand, the person is being buried nearby, da‘atan alav u-khemunah lifneihem dami – their mind is on him and it is as if he is placed before them. In such a case, they would not begin shiva until those charged with the burial return and say that the person has been buried.^[29]

               b. Accompaniment and Leave-Taking

In the situation that Rava is addressing, the relatives have been with the deceased person from the time of that person’s death. They have accompanied the person on the first part of their final journey – as the mefareish describes it, “they accompany the dead for a parsah or a mil and return.”

What seems to generate the beginning of aveilut for these people, then, is not the fact that they will not be present at their relative’s burial. It is the fact that they are now taking their final leave from their deceased relative. Accompanying the person and then turning away from them and setting back toward home is a leave-taking similar to that effected by setimat ha-goleil, whether that refers to sealing the coffin or completing the burial. As Rashi explains, “Even though aveilut does not take effect until setimat ha-goleil, for you, who will not continue to see him, this is like setimat ha-goleil.”^[30] They have been together with the person who has died, and now they are parting from that person for the last time.

               c. Ceasing to Be Occupied With the Needs of the Deceased Person

The relatives in Rava’s case had been in a state of aninut before parting from their deceased family member. At the moment that they turn away from accompanying that person toward their burial place, they are no longer occupied with the needs of the dead. From that moment on, the deceased person will be transported by other people and, finally, buried by other people. Thus, it is not only that the relatives have taken their leave from their family member; they have also shifted from being occupied with that person’s needs to having no more tasks to accomplish in relation to the person’s burial. While, as noted earlier, the beginning of aveilut is not triggered by a prior state of aninut, if the relatives were to continue to be involved in dealing with tzorkhei ha-meit, presumably their state of aninut would continue and shiva would not yet begin.

     III.      When Does Shiva Begin for Relatives Who Are Out of Town?

               a. Rava’s Instructions to the People of Mehoza and the Case of a Relative Who Is Out of Town

For some poskim, the case of a person who is out of town when their relative dies and who won’t be present at the burial is analogous to the case of the people of Mehoza. If the people of Mehoza begin shiva when they are no longer with their deceased relative, then the person who is out of town should begin shiva immediately upon hearing about their relative’s death, since at that point and thenceforward they are not and will not be in the presence of their relative.^[31]

While the similarity between these two situations may seem intuitive, there is an important difference between the cases. The people of Mehoza have been occupied with the dead person and have been in their presence. They have begun to accompany the person to their final resting place and now, at the gate of the city, they are about to turn back and go home. At this moment, they are taking their leave of their deceased relative; they are “turning their faces” from the person and will never see them again. This moment, then, is like setimat ha-goleil, and so it is now that shiva begins.

The person who hears of the death of a relative while in a different city, in contrast, has not undergone any kind of leave-taking. There has been no shift from being in the person’s presence and tending to their needs; there has been no turning back from accompanying the person. There is nothing, one could argue, that would trigger the beginning of shiva for these people, and so shiva would begin only when the person is actually brought to burial.

Netziv makes a similar point in relation to Shulhan Arukh’s codification of the Yerushalmi ruling that aninut restrictions terminate when the dead person is “handed over” to others for burial: “It seems clear that this rule is only in a case of someone whose dead is mutal le-fanav and he is occupied with him, and then, when he hands him over to be buried, he takes his leave from him and practices aveilut, which is not the case when someone is in a different city and was not occupied with him – he does not practice aveilut until he is actually buried.”^[32] Netziv supports this distinction by focusing on the word nimsar –  “handed over” – understanding it to suggest that it is the act of handing over that triggers a change in status, since until now the relative was tending to the deceased person’s needs and is no longer doing so. Rabbeinu Tam’s practice is referenced by the Netziv as well since, even if one were to rule in accordance with Rabbeinu Tam and not practice aninut if in a different city from the deceased person, one would still not begin shiva until the burial takes place, as Rabbeinu Tam seems not to have done.^[33]

To my mind, this distinction between the Mehoza case and the case of nimsar le-katafim, on the one hand, and our case in question, on the other hand, is sufficient to suggest that a person who is in a distant location from where their relative dies should not begin shiva on hearing about the death of their relative, but rather wait until the time of burial to begin shiva.^[34] But there are a number of additional factors that come into play in modern times that I believe make this conclusion inescapable. In fact, these additional factors might even be relevant to the case of someone who sends their deceased relative off for burial, though it could be argued that, in such a case, the leave-taking and the shift from being in the person’s presence and directly occupied with their needs trump any other considerations, and so aveilut would still begin at the moment of turning back. In our case, though, these additional factors join with the core consideration just discussed – that the person who is in a distant location has had no leave-taking and no change in engagement with their deceased relative – and support the conclusion that aveilut does not begin until burial.

               b. Modern Communication and the Status of a Bereaved Relative Before Burial

First is the factor of knowing when the burial takes place. As noted above, the simple reading of Rambam and Shulhan Arukh is that shiva begins immediately for a person who sends their deceased relative to be buried in a distant place specifically if that person does not know when the burial will take place. With the advent of telegrams and, later, telephones, people could be informed as to when the burial is planned to take place or when it has taken place.^[35] While, as noted, some poskim believe that the core criterion is distance, not lack of knowledge of the time of burial, for those who do take lack of knowledge of the time of burial as a necessary criterion for beginning shiva upon parting from a deceased relative, modern communication would make such a ruling moot in most cases.

Indeed, even if the core criterion is distance, it might be argued that the whole notion of distance has shifted in our age of simultaneous communication. When relatives live far away, they are no longer simply informed by receipt of a telegram of the death and anticipated date of burial, but are often in frequent communication from the time of death until after the burial.. As such, individuals who live far from where the burial will be taking place can experience a kind of proximity to both the events taking place and to the relatives who are directly involved in the burial and who will thus begin shiva right after the burial. In the words of Ramban, discussing those who, unlike our case, have sent their relative to be buried nearby, “da‘atan alav u-khemunah lifneihem dami.”

Second, as noted earlier, nowadays even relatives who are out of town are often engaged in some ways with arrangements for the funeral and burial. The relative who is in the same place as the deceased person might be calling the distant relatives for advice or planning the funeral together with them. The relatives who are distant might be engaged in communication to friends and family about the funeral and burial, and they might be writing a eulogy to be read on their behalf at the funeral. As such, it is arguably the case that these relatives have the status of aninut up until the burial, and that this might be so even according to Rabbeinu Tam. They are occupied in tzorkhei ha-meit, and therefore aveilut should not begin until burial.

Finally, in the past few years, accelerated by the Covid pandemic, simultaneous video platforms such as Zoom have made it common for funerals to be livestreamed and even for people to have the opportunity to deliver eulogies at funerals virtually, from a great distance. If the relatives who are distant are participating in the funeral, either simply watching it online or especially delivering a eulogy virtually, then it seems absurd that these individuals could already have begun sitting shiva.^[36] And beginning shiva before participating in the funeral and perhaps even offering a eulogy in their relative’s honor, as if they are done occupying themselves with their deceased relative and as if they have already shifted their attention from that relative,^[37] might even seem contradictory to the honor that they seek to render toward the relative whom they are mourning.

               c. Conclusion

I have argued here that a person who is distant from the location of their deceased relative and who will not be traveling to attend the funeral should begin shiva only upon the burial of their relative, especially if they are involved in planning for the funeral and will be participating in the funeral virtually. My core argument is based on a salient distinction between the case of a person who accompanies their deceased relative on their final journey and then turns back while their relative continues to be transported to their burial place, and the case of a person who is not in the presence of their relative and undergoes no leave-taking or shift in presence or engagement with the deceased person. In addition, I have argued that modern means of communication, and especially simultaneous forms of communication including video platforms such as Zoom, popularized during the Covid pandemic, have caused significant changes with respect to access to information, the notion of distance, and modes and experiences of participation. With such forms of communication, the deceased person continues to be munah lifnei the distant relatives, both in relation to their experience of the person – da‘atan alav – and, often, in relation to their engagement with the person’s needs. And, if the relatives will be participating virtually in the funeral, having begun shiva before that time seems absurd, and possibly even contrary to the respect due to the deceased, who has yet to be honored with this final farewell.

It goes without saying that each of my arguments here can be, and in many cases has been, disputed or weighed differently with respect to competing considerations. My aim here, beyond offering my own perspective, has been to raise the question and to demonstrate that the answer is not straightforward: it is not unequivocally generated by analogy to the case of Rava and the people of Mehoza, and contemporary forms of communication, including some very recent changes in the use of virtual platforms, need to be addressed as well. I welcome engagement with the question and with the arguments and considerations that I have raised.

[1] A person who has lost an immediate relative is generally in a state of aninut until the relative’s burial. An onein – a person who is in the state of aninut – is exempt from the performance of mitzvot. Aninut will be discussed in detail in section I, below.

[2] The relationship between R. Bun’s teaching and the two explanations for the exemption from mitzvot mentioned in the Yerushalmi can be understood in a variety of ways. See, for example, R. Asher Weiss, Minchas Asher, “Dinei Onein U-petur Mitzvot Be-aninut” for a different understanding from the one suggested here.

[3] See Leviticus 18:5 for a juxtaposition of the performance of mitzvot and life; this verse is the basis of a number of possible understandings of the relationship between mitzvot and living.

[4] See R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s understanding of aninut in “Avelut Yeshanah and Avelut Chadashah: Historical and Individual Mourning,” in Out of the Whirlwind: Essays on Mourning, Suffering and the Human Condition (Ktav, 2003), 12-13.

[5] Berakhot 17b-18a, s.v. “Ve-eino mevareikh.”

[6] See, for example, Tosafot on Berakhot 17b-18a, s.v. “Ve-eino mevareikh”; Bah on Tur, Yoreh Dei’ah 341:4.

[7] The list of relatives for whom one practices aveilut is linked in halakhic literature with the Torah’s list of relatives for whom a kohein becomes impure (Leviticus 21:2-3). In relation to aveilut for a married sister, from the perspective of this linkage, see Lehem Mishneh on Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Eivel 2:2 and Ramban, Torat Ha-Adam, ed. Mordechai Popovitz (Mossad Harav Kook: Jerusalem, 2022) 81, 456-457. Those who disagree with Rabbeinu Tam’s practice, such as Rosh (see below), assume that Rabbeinu Tam would hold the same position in relation to any relative; this, in fact, is a strong basis for their disagreement with his position, for that would suggest that, in any situation in which a particular relative is dealing with the deceased person, other relatives would not practice aninut, and that does not seem to be the case. (Bah, Yoreh Dei’ah 341:4, supporting Rabbeinu Tam’s position, also does not distinguish between different relatives; he argues that, had Rabbeinu Tam been in town and his sister’s husband out of town, Rabbeinu Tam would have been subject to the practices of aninut and the husband would not.) The possibility that a married sister is different in this regard is raised by R. Moses ben Abraham me-Geza Zevi, Tiferet Le-Moshe, 130.

[8] Rosh, Berakhot 3:3 and Mo’eid Katan 3:55; Tur, Yoreh Dei’ah 341.

[9] See, for example, Shakh on Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Dei’ah 341:5; Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Yoreh Dei’ah 341:12.

[10] See also Tur, Yoreh Dei’ah 341. Tur cites Rosh’s rejection of Rabbeinu Tam’s position and, immediately after that, the ruling about nimsar le-katafim.

[11] This explanation of Shulhan Arukh’s different ruling for the case of the person who is out of town and the case of the person who hands over responsibility for burial to the katafim only makes sense if Shulhan Arukh is assuming that the person who is out of town will be present at the burial. While it is possible to argue that this was true in the case of Rabbeinu Tam (see n. 33, below), it is not stated as a criterion of the general ruling that Shulhan Arukh codifies about a person who is out of town when their relative dies.

[12] Whether the rules of aninut cease to apply in the case of nimsar le-katafim even if the relatives will be present at the burial or only if the relatives do not plan to be present at the burial is the subject of dispute. See  Beit Yosef on Tur, Yoreh Dei’ah 341:3, citing Hagahot Maimoniyot on Mishneh Torah, Hikhot Eivel 4:6, and Pitchei Teshuvah, Yoreh Dei’ah 341:21. Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Yoreh Dei’ah 341: 20-22 suggests that the case of nimsar le-katafim relates to a situation in which the dead person will be taken to a different city, and so, in his opinion, it is similar to the situation about which Rava instructs the people of Mehoza, discussed below.

[13] David Brofsky, Hilkhot Avelut: Understanding the Laws of Mourning (Jerusalem: Maggid Press, 2019), 41-43.

[14] Note that Hokhmat Adam 153, who is generally cited as holding that, once the hevrah kadisha takes over, a relative would not be subject to aninut restrictions, nevertheless suggests that, if there are tasks still to be done – such as deciding on the exact place of burial or engagement in hespeid – the relative would still be exempt from performing mitzvot until those tasks are completed.

[15] For a somewhat different perspective, relating to situations in which a person is distant from their deceased relative, see R. Asher Weiss, “Dinei Onein U-petur Mitzvot Be-aninut.” (Note that R. Weiss assumes here that aveilut for relatives who are far away does not begin until after burial; he is simply discussing whether they are exempt from mitzvot during the period of time before burial.)

[16] See, for example, Hagahot Maimoniyot on Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Eivel 4:2; Rosh, Berakhot 3:3 and Mo’eid Katan 3:55. Note that, in the contemporary setting, whether or not to begin shiva is left to the discretion of the family, based on a variety of considerations; see Shlomo Levi, “The Laws of Burial and Mourning in Wake of the Recent Events in Gaza,” 2016. (https://etzion.org.il/en/halakha/yoreh-deah/mourning/laws-burial-and-mourning-wake-recent-events-gaza). Thank you to my student Sarah Pollack for bringing this article to my attention.

[17] Magein Avraham on Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 548:8.

[18] See below, n. 33.

[19] Sanhedrin 47b, s.v. “Rav Ashi amar.”

[20] Sanhedrin 47b, s.v. “Mi-sheyistom ha-goleil”; Berakhot 19b, s.v. “Medalegin hayinu”; see the discussion in Ramban, Torat Ha-Adam 41, 306-310, quoted in Tur, Yoreh Dei’ah 375:1.

[21] The commentary that appears on the printed page of the Talmud where Rashi’s commentary generally appears has been shown not to have been authored by Rashi; Rashi’s own commentary appears as “Rashi ketav yad” in some editions of the Talmud, such as the Oz Vehadar edition. The commentary that appears in the outer margin is referred to here as the mefareish. The comment under discussion appears in both commentaries, on Mo’eid Katan 22a, s.v. “De-lo azlitu batar arsa.”

[22] Rambam uses the Hebrew word medinah to refer to a city, likely influenced by the Arabic cognate, which has that meaning; see Perishah on Tur, Yoreh Dei’ah 375:13.

[23] While this seems to me to be the straightforward reading of Rambam, see Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Yoreh Dei’ah 375:8 and Responsa Maharsham, Yoreh Dei’ah 260, who understand Rambam’s reference to not knowing the time of burial as being simply what usually would be true of such a case, rather than as a criterion for the ruling.

[24] See Radbaz on Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Eivel 1:5, s.v. “Mi she-darkan.”

[25] See the position of Bahag cited and discussed in Torat Ha-Adam 53, 346-347; Tur, Yoreh Dei’ah 375; and Bah 375:3. According to this position, it is the turning back per se that is determinative, even if the burial takes place in the same city and even if the relatives will be told when the burial has taken place.

[26] This seems to be the understanding of Bah on Tur, Yoreh Dei’ah 375:3.

[27]  R. Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Dei’ah 2:170) points out that, if they do not know when the burial will take place, relatives could begin shiva when they estimate that the burial has taken place; because of this, he rejects not knowing when the burial will take place as a criterion for beginning shiva right away. See Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Yoreh Dei’ah 341:12, who (in reference not to the case of sending the person away for burial but of being distant from the person who has died) says that the relative should begin shiva from the time of burial “according to his estimate.”

[28] I am using this phrase to render nitya’ashu mi-menu, literally “gave up on him” or “despaired of him,” a term more literally applicable to a situation in which a dead body cannot be found or cannot be recovered (see Torat Ha-Adam 15, 138-139; the term appears in Semahot 2:9-10 and is used in relation to such cases by many Rishonim). It is used by Ramban here in a less literal sense to characterize the state of mind of the person who is parting from the deceased relative whom they have been accompanying.

[29] Torat Ha-adam 53, 346. While Ramban affirms Rambam’s ruling, it is not clear that he understands not knowing when the burial will take place as an essential criterion of that ruling; see Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Yoreh Dei’ah 375:8. The criterion of distance – if it is a criterion – might relate not to lack of knowledge of when the burial will take place, as Rambam seems to suggest, but to the mindset of the relatives. If the burial will be taking place not very distant from where the relatives are, it could happen that there will be a mishap and the relatives will be called upon to advise those who are taking care of the burial as to how they should proceed; thus, they are still in a state of da‘atan alav u-khemunah lifneihem dami. See the discussion of this point in Igros Moshe, Yoreh Dei’ah 2:170.

[30] Rashi ketav yad on Mo’eid Katan 22a, s.v. “Atchilu”; see also Ramban, Torat Ha-adam 53, quoted above.

[31] Poskim who argue or simply assume that these cases are analogous include R. Refael Shapiro, Torat Refa’el 3:44 (regarding someone who receives a telegram that their relative has died and will be buried the following day; R. Shapiro notes that this in fact happened in his family, when they received a telegram from Warsaw that his father-in-law, Netziv, had died, and that the burial would be on the following day – see next note for Netziv’s own position regarding such a situation); R. Moshe Feinstein, Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Dei’ah 1:253 (regarding a person who dies in Belgium and some relatives are flying there while others are staying home; the relatives who are staying home know that the burial will not take place until the traveling relatives arrive); R. Simcha Bunim Schreiber, Sheivet Sofer, Yoreh Dei’ah 106 (regarding a person who receives a telegram that their brother has died and that burial will take place in two days); R. Mordechai Yaakov Breish, Chelkat Ya’akov, Yoreh Dei’ah 220 (regarding parents in Switzerland who receive a telegram that their daughter has died in an airplane crash over Norway and that the State of Israel is planning to bring the dead to burial in Israel at an undetermined time); R. Sholom Mordechai Schwadron, Shu”t Maharsham 2:260 (regarding a person who receives a telegram that his sister has died in Vienna and that her burial will take place after 48 hours have passed from the time of death). In all of these cases, the person whom the inquiry concerns will not be traveling to the burial; the cases vary as to whether the day of burial is known, whether it can be approximated, or whether it is completely unknown but will certainly be delayed.

[32] R. Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Shu”t Meishiv Davar 2:72 (regarding a person who learns that his relative has died and that the burial will not take place for a day or two). See also R. Meir Arik, Shu”t Imrei Yosher 1:180 (regarding a person who receives a telegram that his mother died and that the burial will be the following day).

[33] Some poskim who believe that shiva should begin immediately for a relative who is in a distant place and will not be at the burial explain Rabbeinu Tam’s practice by (among other things) referring to the version of the story about his sister’s death that appears in Rabbeinu Yona, Berakhot 13b (in Dapei Ha-Rif). According to this version, the sister was going to be brought to Rabbeinu Tam’s town for burial, and that is why Rabbeinu Tam did not begin shiva until after her burial. But, according to these poskim, had the burial taken place in his sister’s own town, Rabbeinu Tam would have begun shiva immediately upon hearing the news of her death. See, for example, Torat Refa’el 3:44.

[34] It is worth noting that Arukh Ha-Shulhan seems to regard this conclusion as so obvious as not to need stating. In Yoreh Dei’ah 341:12, within a section concerning aninut, he discusses the dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and Rosh, and concludes that one should practice in accordance with Tur and Shulhan Arukh – that is, to observe aninut restrictions even if one is in a different city from one’s deceased relative. In that context, Arukh Ha-Shulhan comments: “And therefore one who is informed by telegraph that a relative has died should observe aninut until the time of burial, according to his estimate.” Note that what Arukh Ha-Shulhan is pointing out here is not that aveilut does not begin until burial – the place for such a ruling would be in siman 375, which discusses when aveilut begins. Rather, Arukh Ha-Shulhan is applying his ruling about aninut to his contemporary situation, in which a person might receive a telegram that their relative has died, and he says that the person should observe aninut until aveilut begins. Clearly, it is obvious to him that aveilut would not begin until burial, and he sees no reason to state that ruling.

[35] This is the case in several of the teshuvot cited in nn. 31 and 32, above; those, of course, address situations in which the person is distant from the deceased person, not situations in which the person accompanies the deceased person and then parts from them on their way to burial, discussed in Rambam and Shulhan Arukh based on the Mehoza case.

[36] R. Asher Bush, in “Hatchalat Aveilut le-Mi she-Eino Nimtza bi-Kevurat Aviv u-Mishtateif a”y ha-Telefon,” Beis Yitzchak 46 (5775), 480-483, distinguishes between a relative who is giving advice or who is delivering a eulogy, whom he believes would not begin aveilut right way, and a relative who is not occupied with these things but will be planning to listen to the eulogies over the telephone, whom he believes should begin aveilut right away. R. Bush is focused exclusively on whether the person is oseik be-tzorkhei ha-meit (occupied with the needs of their dead relative), which would render that person an onein, and he understands a person who is simply listening to the eulogies to be not so occupied. I am suggesting, though, the additional consideration of a fundamental contradiction between participating in the funeral (even virtually and even as a listener/viewer rather than speaker) and having begun shiva, whether or not we consider the relative to be an onein.

[37] As noted in n. 28, above, I am using this phrase to render the contrast articulated by Ramban between da’atan alav and nitya’ashu mi-menu. I in no way mean to suggest that a person who has commenced aveilut is not thinking about the relative whom they have lost; I am, rather, pointing to the shift in state of mind that takes place when the person has taken their final leave from their deceased relative, a shift that triggers aveilut.