Elisha Price
Introduction
Perhaps the most famous of the many great Hasidic works is Sefer Ha-Tanya, known colloquially as “Tanya.” Written in 1796 by the founder of Habad Hasidism, R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi (the “Alter Rebbe,” 1745-1812), it represents the foundation of Habad philosophy and is a central text of Hasidic thought. Of the many sayings and propositions laid out in Tanya, perhaps the most well-known, is:
The second soul of a Jew is truly a part of God above [Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al], as it is written, “He breathed into his nostrils a soul of life,” and “You have breathed it [the soul] into me.” And it is written in the Zohar, “He who blows, blows from within him,” that is to say, from his inwardness and his innermost, for it is something of his internal and innermost vitality that man emits through exhaling with force (Tanya, Part 1, Ch. 2, trans. Kehot Publication Society).
The basis of this passage, which ostensibly states that Jews have a second, Godly, soul, is a tenet of classical Hasidism.[1] What is unique about this particular passage is its phrase “Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al mamash,” which may be translated loosely as “[it] is truly (or literally) a portion of God above.” Here, the expression “a portion of God” is apparently used to mean a portion of the Godhead, a literal piece of God Himself, or, at least, its extension.
However, the source of the phrase couldn’t be more distant from that meaning. The phrase is taken from a verse towards the end of the Book of Job, wherein Job declares his integrity before God thusly, bitterly expressing the difference between what he believes he is owed and the reality that is before him:
I made a covenant with mine eyes; How then should I look upon a maid? For what would be the portion of God from above [Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al], And the heritage of the Almighty from on high? … Let me be weighed in a just balance, That God may know mine integrity (Job 31:1-2, 6, trans. JPS Bible, 1917).
In its original context then, the phrase does not mean “portion of God,” but “portion from God.” According to the normative interpretation, supplied by Rashi (1040-1105), this phrase is a reference to the reward that Job feels he deserves for his good behavior, which he has not yet received (he has instead been severely punished).[2]
The question, of course, is how R. Shneur Zalman got from point A to point B. Why would he take a portion of a verse that had a clear interpretation and hijack it for this other purpose? This, on top of the fact that the purpose for which he applied the phrase is a theologically radical statement: the idea that there is within every Jew a literal “portion of God” is difficult to accept, because it implies either that God can be divided into many small parts (an idea which had long since been viewed as heretical),[3] or else that there are many smaller divinities that emanate from God,[4] which would, of course, violate the principle of monotheism upon which Judaism rests.[5] Thus, the difficulties with this line in Tanya are twofold: One, the phraseology, which appears to be a radical reinterpretation of a line from Scripture; two, the content, which appears to be theologically compromising no matter how it is interpreted.
Of course, though Tanya’s is the most systematic use of Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al in such a context, it is hardly the only one. Consider the following passage from the thirteenth century book of ethics, Sefer Ha-Yashar:
Scripture says (Gen. 2:7), “Then the Lord God formed man of the dust of the earth.” Now here it speaks of the creation of the body out of the dust, but it does not speak of the creation of the soul of this created being. But it does say (ibid.) “And He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.” And we can understand from these words, “and He breathed,” that He took it from His own self and did not create it, but that He caused a portion of his glory to emanate and gave it to man, just as He caused an emanation to come from the spirit which was upon Moses, our teacher, peace unto him, and gave it to the seventy elders… (Sefer Ha-Yashar, 5, trans. Seymour J. Cohen, 1973).
For the author of Sefer Ha-Yashar, the soul is indeed a portion of the Godhead, which God takes from His Self and implants into humanity. He identifies this portion with what is typically known as ru’ah ha-kodesh, which means ‘Holy Spirit’ or – to avoid confusion with the Third Person of the Christian Trinity – ‘Divine inspiration.’ In addition, in a compilation of teachings supposedly from the legendary Ba’al Shem Tov (c. 1700-1760), the phrase “Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al” is used to refer to the soul in a statement that greatly resembles our line from Tanya.[6] Armed with this, one might be tempted to suggest that, though on logical grounds the question is sound, R. Shneur Zalman was well within his rights to accept this minority position, and should not be blamed for the difficulties found therewithin. A simple appeal to authority may satisfy some, but it does little to resolve the questions we have raised, especially given their severity. At most, it manages to deflect the question onto these earlier authorities, but it does not satisfy them. Even so, given Tanya’s more expansive and systematic use of the term, the questions are still best levied against his expression of this idea. Also, though this approach addresses – to some degree or another – the second question we put forth – the radical nature of the statement – it fails to contend with the misappropriation of the phrase from its source. Thus we find this apologetic response, too, to be insufficient.
Traditionally, two non-answers are offered in an attempt to avoid contending with the issues we have raised. The first is to assume that R. Shneur Zalman was being non-literal, using figurative language so as to express a point that he was passionate about. In this bout of passion, not every word makes theological sense, but, on the whole, the idea might be preserved. After all, the Talmud itself says that “the Sages spoke using exaggerated language” (Tamid 29a). Exaggeration is not unexpected coming from a decent pedagogue; not every lesson can be taught through literal statements.
Of course, the difficulty of this rebuttal is the word R. Shneur Zalman inserted into the verse’s original phrase: “mamash” (“literally” or “truly”). It would be most unusual to insert the word “literally” into a context in which you intend to be something other than literal. Authorial intent is often hard to gauge, but one is tempted to follow diction over theological consistency, especially in so late a work.
The second suggestion is offered by those who wish to avoid confronting the issue but approach it from the other direction. Instead of having faith in R. Shneur Zalman’s source, be it Sefer Ha-Yashar or something else, or else being willing to wave away the details by assuming that Tanya was written with purposeful imprecision, this group simply accepts the premise and logical extension of the questions we raised and soundly concludes that this passage from Tanya is, in fact, heretical. For example, after a very brief treatment of Tanya’s claim that “the second soul of a Jew is truly a part of God above,” R. Moshe Ben-Chaim concludes:
We define this quote from Tanya as absolute heresy. This is a most grave sin, as all of our Torah performances are useless if we have any incorrect notion about G-d. This quote denies the words of the prophet, and completely corrupts the words of Job, 31:1,2.[7]
Though initially tempting, especially in the radically dogmatic culture of today, this view, too, seems to fail to properly grapple with the issue at hand, simply accepting the quote at face value and dismissing it as heresy. We must, then, part ways with all of the simple and unsatisfying answers in an attempt to properly understand this passage from Tanya.
Treatment of the Verse
The most obvious place to start our journey to understanding R. Shneur Zalman’s expansion of the phrase from Job is to see how others before him had interpreted the verse itself. However, as we will demonstrate, such writings are few and far between.
Only one reference to this verse can be found in the Talmud, or indeed, any other Hazalic source. This singular instance is in one of the minor tractates of the Talmud, Kallah Rabati, which was written some six hundred years after the publication of the Babylonian Talmud:
‘Rejoice in your portion’ That is [in your] wife; for Scripture declares (Job 31:2) “For what would be the portion of God from above” and it further states (Prob. 19:14) “House and riches are the inheritance of fathers; but a prudent wife is from the Lord” (Kallah Rabati 5).
According to Kallah Rabati, the “portion” described in the phrase “portion from God above” is one’s wife. This is also the interpretation of R. Moses Alshekh (1508-1593), one of the great Kabbalsitic thinkers of the sixteenth century.[8] They derive this position from the parallelistic deployment of the word “maid” at the end of verse 1 and the word “portion” at the beginning of verse 2, asserting that they must refer to the same thing. Hence, a woman, or more precisely, one’s wife, is the “portion from God above” found in verse 2.
As we saw above, Rashi translates the phrase “portion from God above” as the reward Job expected for his general good behavior that he had not (yet) received. Indeed, this is the most strongly represented position on the matter of the phrase’s translation.[9] For our purposes, however, both of these interpretations lead to dead ends; neither one brings us any closer to the usage of the phrase in the Tanya.
However, one prominent biblical commentator, Ramban (1194-1270), puts forth the following – radical – interpretation:
And what is the portion from God above: I would say in my heart, ‘what that I should gaze at a maid and sin? For what is the “portion from God above?” [That] to add calamity onto injustice [by doing] a strange and foreign thing (i.e. sin) does not even enter the mind; therefore, I will refrain from sin because of my fear of Him; thus I have spoken.’[10]
This comment from Ramban appears to assert that this “Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al” is not “a portion from God above” (as Rashi writes) nor is it “a portion of God above” (the version found in Tanya), but something in between. The most precise translation, for Ramban, might be “a portion in God above.” Said otherwise, it is the relationship or covenant that one shares with God that causes one to avoid sin. Because Job is righteous, his “Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al” prevents him from sinning by gazing at the maid.[11] His claim against God is that since he minded this Heilek Elo’ah and refused to sin, he doesn’t deserve the ill treatment that he is currently receiving.
Though Ramban doesn’t quite bridge the gap between the verse and the passage in the Tanya entirely, he does provide the first few planks. Instead of understanding the phrase “Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al” as a reward or woman, Ramban believes it to be something internal to the person. An inherent moral code or relationship with God that provides one with moral direction, or something along those lines. This is a far cry from the secondary soul referenced in Tanya, but it brings us much closer than did Rashi or Alshekh.
The “Soul” in Kabbalistic[12] Thought
Armed with an understanding of “Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al” that is amiable towards mystical interpretation, we have another major hurdle to clear before we can conclude that the interpretation of “Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al” provided by R. Shneur Zalman is rooted in the verse itself, as understood by Ramban. We must first ascertain whether R. Shneur Zalman’s concept of a soul, what he believes “Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al” refers to, is compatible with the moral-code definition of Ramban. In order to do so, we must take a step back and attempt to define the term “soul” according to Kabbalistic teaching.
The idea of a soul in Jewish literature is ancient. Though noticeably missing from the biblical corpus, references to the soul date back at least as far as the Sages of the Talmud (c. 200-600 CE), if not to the Sages of the Mishnah (c. 100 BCE-200 CE).[13] However, the Kabbalists’ tradition about the nature of the soul differs somewhat from the traditional non-Kabbalistic version. So, whereas the Midrash speaks about a unified soul for which the five words for soul in rabbinic and biblical literature [nefesh (lit. “lifesblood”), ru’ah (“spirit”), neshamah (“lifesbreath”), yehidah (“singularity”), and hayyah (“liveliness”)] are merely synonyms,[14] Kabbalah proposes a five-tiered system wherein souls may be organized and deconstructed. Since many versions of this system are found, we will content ourselves with the normative Lurianic tradition, which derives from the writings of the Zohar and the innovative mystical system of R. Isaac Luria (“Arizal,” c. 1534-1572).
In the Zohar, the first three layers of the soul are described thusly:
Now the soul is a compound of three grades, and hence it has three names, to wit, nefesh (vital principle), ru’ah (spirit), and neshamah (soul proper). Nefesh is the lowest of the three, ru’ah is a grade higher, whilst neshamah is the highest of all and dominates the others (Zohar Vol. I, 205b-206a, trans. adapted from Sincino Press, London, 1933).
For the Zohar, these three terms represent the basic structure of the soul. This would later be termed “nefesh ha-behemit,” the animalistic soul.[15] One of R. Luria’s great pupils, R. Hayyim Vital (1543-1620), expounds on this hierarchy. He writes that a person is born with a nefesh, as this is the life-force. Upon beginning to mature (defined in the Jewish tradition as twelve years of age for females and thirteen for males), one gains ru’ah, and at age twenty (which is, according to Jewish tradition, the end of the maturation period), the neshamah.[16] The hayyah is often set aside in Kabbalistic sources, viewed as an aura of sorts rather than an actual portion of the soul. Lastly, the yehidah, which is viewed as the highest level of the soul, is also seen as somewhat distant from the soul’s internal structure, but as the point of connection between humanity and God.[17]
Thus, in Kabbalah, souls are structural, complex, and somewhat dynamic things, unbound, as it were, by the rigidity of Aristotelian philosophy. “Soul” is a word that means many things to the Kabbalist – life-force, proclivities, spiritual radiance, and more.
Resolution
This all leads to the conclusion that R. Shneur Zalman’s statement, “The second soul of a Jew is truly a part of God above,” is hardly as radical as we may have assumed. Perhaps all he meant by it was that the secondary radiance of a Jew is godly. Indeed, he had just finished speaking about the emanations from whence the souls of Jews and Gentiles come.[18] The first soul of the Jew, he writes, is the one that gives life to the body. “From it stem all the evil characteristics deriving from the four evil elements which are contained in it.”[19] By contrast, the second soul of the Jew “is truly a part of God above.” In other words, to contrast with the first soul, which contains great impurity, R. Shneur Zalman attributes the second soul to the ultimate Purity, namely God Himself. If this is so, then it is not the case that he is asserting that a small bit of the Godhead resides inside each Jew, but that in every Jew is a spark of divinity (with a small ‘d’); a yetzer tov (“will of good”) to match the yetzer ha-ra (“will of bad”).
Indeed, if this is the case, then R. Shneur Zalman is drawing on a long tradition of comparing elements of the soul with God without fully attributing Divinity. To take an early and explicit example of this, the Midrash writes:
The soul is like its Creator: Just as God sees but is not seen, so too the soul sees but is not seen; just as God does not sleep, so too the soul does not sleep; just as God bears His world, so the soul bears the whole body. All souls are His, as it says (Ezek. 18:4), “Behold, all souls are mine.”[20]
A similar idea can be found in the writings of Ramban, who believes the human to be a composite of the physical world they inhabit and the spiritual world of the Divine to which they can aspire.[21]
Finally, this interpretation of R. Shneur Zalman’s idea brings us back to Ramban’s treatment of “Heilek Elo’ah Mi-ma’al.” As we said before, Ramban understands that phrase, in its original context, to refer to an internalized moral code, implanted within mankind by God. In a sense, this seems almost identical to the notion of the second soul presented by R. Shneur Zalman, albeit formulated rather differently: both, in the end, really mean to refer to the influence of the Divine upon man. Much as C.S. Lewis writes that one ought not serve God out of a desire to reach Heaven, “because a first faint gleam of Heaven is already inside” them,[22] R. Shneur Zalman asserts that the desired result (a perfect servant of God) can already be perceived in the imperfect vessel.[23] Thus, it is both the case that R. Shneur Zalman’s interpretation of the verse is rational and precedented; and that the philosophical idea presented therewithin, though coated in the mystery of mysticism, is one that had echoed in the corpus of the Jewish tradition already for centuries.
[1] In Tanya, as in most Kabbalistic systems of thought, there is a “base” soul that is common to all living creatures which comprises instincts, desires, and basic intelligence. (Tanya, Part I, Ch. 1). We will deal with the elements of the soul in Kabbalistic thought later in this article.
[2] Rashi to Job 31:2, s.v. “she-gemalani kakh.”
[3] See Rambam (1138-1204), Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:7; Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, Positive Commandment 2.
[4] From the text itself, the latter possibility seems more likely, given R. Shneur Zalman’s frequent use of the metaphor of a son springing out of his father’s brain to explain this concept in the continuation of the passage.
[5] There is another passage at the end of Tanya where R. Shneur Zalman presents an alternate view of the soul which may avoid some of the problems we raise here. Though potentially very interesting, it is beyond the scope of this essay. See Tanya, Iggeret Ha-Teshuvah 5.
[6] Ba’al Shem Tov, Gen. 88. See also Kli Yakar to Gen. 1:31, 2:7, 9:20; Exod. 20:12, 13.
[7] Moshe Ben-Chaim, Tanya and Heresy. (n.d.).
[8] Alshekh, Helkat Mehokeik to Job 31:2.
[9] See also, e.g., Malbim (1809-1879) to Job 31:2; R. David Altschuler (1687-1769), Metzudat David, ad loc, s.v. “u-mah heilek.”
[10] Ramban to Job 31:2, s.v. “u-mah heilek Elo’ah mi-ma’al.”
[11] See also R. Hayyim ibn Attar (c. 1696-1743), Ohr Ha-hayyim to Exod. 32:4.
[12] Kabbalah, or Jewish mysticism, is a holistic theory about the interactions between the physical world and the emanations of God (called sefirot), proposed with some variation by some of the greatest scholars in Jewish history, from R. Simeon b. Joḥai (1st Century CE) to Ramban to Arizal.
[13] See, e.g., Pirkei de-R. Eli’ezer 34:12; Shabbat 152b; Sanhedrin 91b.
[14] See Gen. Rabbah 14:9.
[15] See, e.g., Tanya, Part 1, Ch. 9
[16] See, e.g., the first passages of R. Vital’s Sha’ar Ha-Gilgulim; Eitz Hayyim, Derush Igulim Ve-Yosher 3. See also Zohar Vol. 3, 29b.
[17] See, e.g., Sulam to Zohar, Intro. 237:8.
[19] Ad cit.
[20] Pirkei de-R. Eli’ezer 34:12.
[21] Ramban to Gen. 1:26, s.v. “va-yomer Elokim na’aseh adam.”
[22] C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Geoffrey Bles, 1952), 148.
[23] For is a Jew anything more than a vessel for the service of God and the “improvement of the world under the Kingship of God” (Aleinu prayer)?
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