Jonathan Ziring
“Jewish law obligates Jews to save the lives of all humans, Jews and gentiles alike, even if it entails violating Shabbat. This is the universal conclusion of all contemporary decisors, despite confusing media reports of a recent public lecture by a senior Israeli scholar.”
This is the summary of the very sensitive halakhic issue of violating Shabbat to save non-Jews posted by Rabbi Shlomo Brody in the popular “Ask the Rabbi” section of The Jerusalem Post.[1] This conclusion is often presented as deriving from one of two kinds of arguments, one “pragmatic” (ibid.), the other ethical. In this article, I would like to illustrate that both kinds of arguments are radical, though for different reasons. This presentation is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of this delicate topic but a case study in how seemingly technical arguments can be radical, depending on the perspective of the analysis. For this reason, I draw heavily on recent summaries of the topic to show how a common perception of this topic misses how both paths are groundbreaking in their own way.
The Mishnah (Yoma 8:6) rules unequivocally that saving a life overrides Shabbat, and even when there is a doubt as to whether a life is in danger, Shabbat is overridden. The Talmud (Yoma 85a-b) raises many sources for this law. The final source brought by Shmuel is the verse that says about the commandments “ve-hai ba-hem,” that one should live through them (Leviticus 18:5), from which the Talmud derives that one should live and not die for the commandments (with the exception of the cardinal sins). The penultimate source is also accepted by many authorities: “Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya said: ‘It is stated: “And the children of Israel shall keep Shabbat, to observe Shabbat” (Exodus 31:16). The Torah said: “Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf so he will observe many Shabbatot’” (Yoma 85b, Koren translation). A simple understanding of this principle is that, from the perspective of Shabbat itself, it is best to violate a single Shabbat to create a net result of more Shabbat observance.
From the Talmudic passage to that mishnah (Yoma 84b), it becomes clear that this law only applies to Jews, as the cases of doubt that the Talmud raises are ones in which it is unclear whether the person in danger is a Jew, in which case Shabbat would be overridden, or a non-Jew, in which case it would not. In another passage dealing with aiding non-Jewish women in giving birth on Shabbat, the Talmud articulates this point as well:
Abaye said to him: “The concern of enmity does not apply here, because she can say to the gentile: ‘With regard to our own women, who keep Shabbat, we desecrate Shabbat for them; with regard to your women, who do not keep Shabbat, we do not desecrate Shabbat for them.’” (Avodah Zarah 26a, Koren translation)
Several points can be derived from this passage:
- Shabbat can only be violated to save Jews.
- The logic for this law is something that can be accepted by both Jews and non-Jews.
- Seemingly, the law is based on the logic that Shabbat is only violated for those who keep Shabbat.
This final point seems to be a derivative of the penultimate source for violating Shabbat noted above, that net Shabbat observance will be increased by violating Shabbat to save a Jew.
Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, in distinguishing between the final two sources for overriding Shabbat to save a life, notes this:
The first [ve-hai bahem] affirms the primacy of one value over another—of preserving human life over observing ritual laws. Hence, it reflects, to however limited an extent, a humanistic concern. The second [desecrate one Shabbat] merely calculates that, even in the interest of ritual observance proper, its temporary abrogation is in order…
[T]he dual source may be salient in another significant context, with respect to the thorny issue of the inclusion of Gentiles in the category of pikkuaḥ nefesh. As regards the first source, the response to a question of pikkuaḥ nefesh may very well be positive.[2] With respect to the second, however—i.e. the possible suspension of Sabbath observance at one point in order to facilitate and engender much fuller observance subsequently—this factor obviously only obtains with respect to the community which has been covenantally charged with shemirat Shabbat. (“Mah Enosh”: Reflections on the Relation between Judaism and Humanism, Torah u-Madda Journal 14 [2006-2007]: 28-29)
This analysis would suggest that this argument is not merely that which would be presented to non-Jews, but it reflects at least part of the theory of the law itself. Rabbi Isser Yehudah Unterman (Shevet Mi-Yehudah 3:70) makes a similar argument, noting that were it not for the sources offered in Yoma, one would assume that violating Shabbat would be a cardinal sin. In fact, he notes that in the Book of Maccabees 1 (chapter 2), a group of rebel Jewish fighters allowed themselves to be killed by the Greeks rather than violate Shabbat, showing that they indeed treated it as a cardinal sin. Matityahu then rejects this and insists that they fight and not die. However, this shows that Shabbat, were it not for its internal calculus of net Shabbat observance, should override life.
The limitation of breaking Shabbat to save a life as only applying to Jews is accepted as standard law, as noted in Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh De’ah 154:2). However, overwhelmingly, this is not the contemporary law, as noted in the quote from Rabbi Brody that I opened with.
Two kinds of reasons are offered for this difference. One is presented as pragmatic, stemming from a concern of hatred that will be caused. Take, for example, this summary by Rabbi Dov Karoll:
Many contemporary authorities have ruled that this principle is not applicable today, and I believe their views can be differentiated into two basic approaches. The mainstream approach responds to the claim of the Gemara that gentiles will understand if Jews are unable to treat them on Shabbat, recognizing that Shabbat violation is only justified for the sake of those who are themselves Shabbat observers. Many authorities over the last few hundred years ruled that the understanding which the Gemara takes for granted cannot be assumed in modern society. Rather, they claim, if Jews refuse to treat gentiles on Shabbat, this refusal could have disastrous ramifications, either for the doctor himself or for the Jewish community as a whole. As such, they rule that one should take whatever actions are necessary to save the life of a gentile, even if it requires violation of Shabbat laws. Within this approach, one should try to minimize the Shabbat violation required, and should only take those Shabbat-violating actions that are truly necessary. Nonetheless, advocates of this approach generally assume that any violation is justified on the grounds that the deleterious consequences of nontreatment could themselves endanger the lives of Jews, and are thus to be understood as piku’ach nefesh for Jews, which, as above, is permitted unconditionally.[3]
Within this approach, there were those who limited this dispensation to the violation of rabbinic law. This, for example, is the position of Rabbi Yitzchok Weiss (Minhat Yitzhak 1:53), the Mishnah Berurah (330:8), and others.[4] However, others contend that the hatred that would be caused by not saving non-Jews on Shabbat allows violating even biblical law. I will return to this below.
The second approach is the “principled” or “ethical” approach (Karoll and Brody respectively). This approach assumes the following: in certain contexts, the Talmud’s laws applying to non-Jews only apply to idolaters. They do not apply to other non-Jews, such as a ger toshav, a non-Jew who has committed to keep the seven Noahide laws. As a general rule, one is obligated to save the latter, and this may extend to Shabbat. (See, for example, Ramban’s Hasagot to Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, Mitzvat Aseh 16.) Meiri argues in general that the harsh approach of the Talmud toward non-Jews was only with regard to those who were not gedurim be-gidrei ha-datot, civilized by religion. He argues that one may violate Shabbat to save non-Jews that fall in this category (see his comments to Yoma 84b). Based on this, many contemporary authorities have ruled against those authorities, including Shulhan Arukh, who cited the Talmud’s laws without limiting them to ancient pagans, even though the non-Jews they knew were more similar to those Meiri was familiar with. In doing so, they embrace the view that saving a contemporary non-Jew is fundamentally valuable, just as saving a Jew. Take this summary from R. Karoll, including his conversation with R. Lichtenstein on the topic:
Alternatively, some authorities take a more principled approach to making this allowance in contemporary society, regardless of concern for the deleterious results of not saving gentile life. The mechanism for this approach is to limit the Gemara’s ruling to gentiles of the type that were common in the society of Talmudic times, i.e. idolaters, claiming that it is not applicable to the gentiles in our society. One source cited as a basis for this view is the Ramban, who counts helping and saving a ger toshav, a gentile who has accepted the seven Noahide laws, including violating Shabbat to save his life, as a mitzvah. If one takes the position of the Ramban (and Rav Ahron Soloveichik points out that there are others who take this view as well), the question then remains whether contemporary gentiles are defined as gerei toshav. Rav Nachum Rabinovitch, rosh yeshiva of the Hesder Yeshiva in Maaleh Adumim and author of Melumedei Milchama,[5] a book of responsa related to army service and security matters, applies the aforementioned principle of the Ramban, and cites authorities who rule that the gentiles of today are generally defined as gerei toshav. As such, he rules that saving the life of a gentile is warranted on Shabbat. My teacher and rosh yeshiva Rav Aharon Lichtenstein of Yeshivat Har Etzion explained to me that while the views that take the first approach address the practical issue, justifying saving the life of a gentile under certain conditions, they sidestep the fundamental issue. Rav Lichtenstein said that were he to be confronted with a case of violating Shabbat to save the life of a gentile, he would act to save the life of the gentile on principle, relying on those views that allow for it in principle, not based on societal concerns alone. Rav Lichtenstein also mentioned that his rebbe and father-in-law, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, ruled that this was permissible even in cases where there would be no problem of negative results, independent of such issues. Along similar lines, Rav Ahron Soloveichik cites numerous sources regarding the status of ben noach and ger toshav, leading to the conclusion that saving the life of a gentile is warranted based on the notion that saving the life of a gentile mandates Shabbat violation on substantive grounds.[6]
From an ethical perspective, this latter approach seems more radical―and thus for some, more attractive. Rabbi Brody summarizes those who are hesitant to be lenient for the former rationale:
While this argumentation practically results in treating all lives equally, some scholars, including Rabbi Yehiel Y. Weinberg, have expressed reservations that the logic stems from overly particularistic and pragmatic considerations.
Many people seem to prefer the “ethical” rather than “pragmatic” argument because they are not comfortable with the notion that saving non-Jews hangs on a technicality. However, it is often missed that despite its technical nature, the pragmatic argument is still indeed radical. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein grounds his permission in the following argument. In a globalized world, if one does not save a non-Jew, that will cause enmity toward the Jews. Somewhere in the world, this is likely to lead to actual bloodshed, making saving the non-Jew a case of saving Jewish life.
Regarding non-Jews on Shabbat… it is clear that if he (the doctor) is in the hospital and refuses to aid a non-Jew for religious reasons, not only will this reason not be accepted, but if there is no other doctor they will consider him negligent and a murderer… So if he is required to be in the hospital on Shabbat, or if he has a practice, and although his office is closed on Shabbat his patients come specifically to him, and a non-Jew comes to him with a matter of risk to life, he is forced to take care of him even if it entails biblical desecration of the Shabbat … because otherwise it would be a true danger to his own life from the relatives of this sick person. And even if he is unconcerned that there will be any danger to him personally, we must be concerned that there will be tremendous hatred from the people of the country and from the government itself, for we must definitely be concerned for the dangers that could result from this. And although Tosafot wonders how it is possible to allow Shabbat desecration because of concern for hatred, given the circumstances in our country nowadays, there exists from a concern of hatred great danger [beyond what Tosafot considered]. Even in democratic countries where every Jew has the right to observe his own religion, however, this is not recognized to extend to a refusal to save a life…
However, in our times, it seems to me that one must be worried about danger everywhere, because of the immediate publicizing of the news through newspapers immediately about what is happening in the entire world. [Due to this], there will be an impediment as it will be learned of in every place and it will provoke an increase of hatred to the point of great murder because of this. Thus, it is obvious in our times that one must treat this as actual danger and one can permit when it occurs. (Iggerot Moshe OC 4:79; part of translation taken from Rabbi Dov Linzer)
Versions of this argument are cited by many major modern authorities, such as Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz Eliezer 8:15:6) and Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer 8:38), and in the summary work Piskei Teshuvot (OC 329:3).
At some level, it is true that this argument is merely “pragmatic” and thus less radical than a view that invokes ethical values to direct legal interpretation. However, from another perspective, it is quite groundbreaking. A perennial interest of mine, and the topic of my recently published Torah in a Connected World: A Halakhic Perspective on Communication Technology and Social Media (Maggid 2024), is the extreme impact that communication technologies can have on Halakhah. For Rabbi Feinstein and others, the change in how fast information can travel affects who we can save and who we cannot, who will live and who will die. Rabbi Dr. Harel Gordon highlights this passage as an example of the ways in which Rabbi Moshe Feinstein dealt with the challenges of Judaism in modernity (Hanhagah Hilkhatit Bi-Olam Mishataneh [Alon Shvut: Tevunot, 5777], 113-123). If one’s focus is our approach to non-Jews, it is true that this argument does not reframe how Jews relate to the other. However, from the perspective of the impact of technology on changing the application of Halakhah, this approach is impressive in its boldness and sweeping in its potential impact.
R. Unterman captures this. Despite that in many other “discriminatory” laws that distinguish between Jews and non-Jews he negates them on “ethical ground,” he does not do this for Shabbat. In many areas, he is willing to say that the Talmudic dictum to act kindly with non-Jews because of darkhei shalom, the ways of peace, reflects fundamental Torah values of imitatio dei. However, he denies the application to Shabbat, for reasons noted above.[7] He accepts, on the other hand, the “pragmatic” argument. However, he anticipates a deep religious opposition to precisely this argument.
It is difficult, however, for those who are meticulous in the commandments to accustom themselves to the idea that despite that which is written by great authorities―that it is forbidden―we find a side to permit. However, this reminds me of what I heard in my youth―that there were God-fearing Jews, careful about the commandments, who criticized a well-known genius who was very lenient about public fast days and easily permitted all who said that they did not feel so well [to eat]. Even on the stringent Yom Ha-Kippurim he tended to be much more lenient than the great halakhic authorities before him. A great scholar said to them: the difference is not between this rabbi in the present and the rabbis in the past but between the current sick people and the sick people in the past. Due to the occasion of great tensions with regard to life, nervousness has increased and the heart has become weak. Therefore, the concern that the fast, with that weakness, could shorten life (God forbid) is very likely and we are obligated to be careful because of this, as it says, “And you shall live through them.”[8]
He assumes that a religious person would be shaken by the changing application of ve-hai bahem and feels compelled to explain that the change in application is not a change in the principle but the application. However, this also highlights how significant a change this is. If one’s starting point is the impact of technology on halakhic decision-making, this example is striking in how weighty the consequences are to seemingly so simple a reality. This case study should encourage students of Halakhah to realize that how radical an argument is depends on the axis upon which one focuses. In this case, focusing on the technological side highlights how central the impact of communication technologies has been on life―and therefore, Halakhah―sensitizing us to see similar phenomena in other areas of Halakhah.
Why does it matter to highlight which aspect of a ruling is novel?
Understanding which element of a halakhic ruling will be surprising is important. A posek must understand his audience and be careful not to weaken their commitment to Halakhah, even by issuing legally correct rulings. Hence, the Talmud warns that one cannot permit something that others treat as forbidden in front of them (Pesahim 50b-51a). Similarly, the Talmud warns against becoming known as a “permitting Beit Din” and on the same page discusses the problem of one who became known as “Rabbi Yossi the Permitter” (Avodah Zarah 37a). Thus, analysis like that of R. Unterman is important as it models how a posek must get into the mind of those hearing his ruling and identify which parts of the pesak will be surprising to them or might challenge their commitments, and address those concerns.
Any ruling that diverges from people’s current practice can undermine their general commitment. For example, Maharatz Chajes (Darkei Hora’ah 6) explains that customs are critical because people express commitment through the actions that they do. Challenging a custom, even a meaningless one, can thus shake people out of commitment. As such, besides for cases where customs are forbidden or problematic, he suggests neither fighting for nor against customs. He acknowledges that if customs fall out of practice naturally, one need not fight to preserve them. His analysis points to how important it is to realize the power of things staying the same. Change is challenging to tradition. Of course, life changes, technologies develop, and law must adapt to reflect the new situation. However, one must be attuned to the challenges that change will bring as people’s lived experience becomes different from what they are used to. R. Unterman’s presentation is aimed at taking that reality seriously.
Furthermore, a posek who identifies trends with potentially broad impact, such as the impact of rapid communication, will be primed to question how other laws may be affected. Such cognizance is critical to accurately apply Halakhah. As I note in my recent book, these technological changes can affect everything from the laws of blessings to the nature of rabbinic authority, not to mention those laws focused on speech and communication, such as those of lashon ha-ra.
Such sensitivities will also open the posek up to grappling with similarly far-reaching changes. As technologies continue to develop, they will radically alter our experience of the world. With that will come new halakhic questions. A.I. is but one glaring example of those technologies that can turn our world upside down. Even when the principles behind the laws emerge authentically from tradition, the applications can feel radically different. Responsible poskim must both be ready to provide guidance as our world changes, while also being pastorally responsible for those whose lived experience of Judaism will change. They need to be ready to show how new applications, as radical as they may seem, are legitimate and in fact an expression of the Torah’s ability to be ever relevant.
[1] https://www.jpost.com/jewish-world/judaism/ask-the-rabbi-may-jews-save-all-lives-on-shabbat.
[2] Rabbi David Fried notes that as the Mishnah had already established the exclusion of non-Jews from the category of pikuah nefesh, it is difficult to explain how this could only be justified according to some rationales in the Gemara. It may be that this kind of logic drives even the ve-hai bahem argument, at least for Shabbat. As we note from Rabbi Unterman in the next paragraph, there was reason to believe that Shabbat would be excepted from the dispensation of pikuah nefesh entirely. R. Lichtenstein himself notes (ibid., n. 136) that his comments were not meant to be exhaustive and require elaboration: “I have limited these remarks to one aspect of the topic. Fuller discussion would of course include far more evidence, textual and historical, as well as the analysis of relevant halakhic and hashkafic variables.” While not focusing on the ethical argument, R. Lichtenstein’s son, Rabbi Mosheh Lichtenstein, argues that in fact this argument must work together with the other sources that allow and obligate violating Shabbat to save a life. See https://asif.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/146pikuach.html.
[3] http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/756185/_Dov_Karoll/Laws_of_Medical_Treatment_on_Shabbat.
[4] Many authorities debate the position of Hatam Sofer on this issue. See his responsa, 2:131 and 5:194.
[5] This appears in Melumdei Milhamah, 43.
[6] Rabbi Dr. David Berger expertly frames the ethical concerns at play in his article, “Jews, Gentiles, and the Modern Egalitarian Ethos: Some Tentative Thoughts,” which appears in Formulating Responses in an Egalitarian Age, ed. Marc D. Stern (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 83-108. The interested reader should read his fuller treatment.
[7] See also Rabbi Aryeh Klapper’s analysis of Rabbi Unterman: https://moderntoraleadership.wordpress.com/2023/06/16/is-risk-of-enmity-an-ethical-band-aid-to-the-organism-of-torah/.
[8] Shevet Mi-Yehudah 3:70. Translation is my own.
Site Operations and Technology by The Berman Consulting Group.