Aryeh Dienstag
Since October 7 and the war that followed, public debate has intensified around the legal status of non-Jews living in the State of Israel.[1] This discussion is often framed as the question of whether Israel should be medinat kol ezraheha, a “nation of all its citizens.”[2] This article attempts to examine the issue of equal rights for all Israeli citizens through a halakhic lens.
Biblical and Talmudic Sources
The primary biblical term describing foreigners or minorities living in the Land of Israel is ger.[3] The commandment to love and accept a ger is mentioned in the Torah no fewer than 36 times.[4] Hazal later divided this category into two distinct types: the ger tzedek, a full convert, and the ger toshav, a non-Jew who retains his identity but lives in the Land of Israel after accepting certain religious and ethical obligations.
A ger toshav is not only permitted to live in the Land of Israel; there is an affirmative obligation to support him. This derives from Vayikra 25:35: “A stranger and a sojourner shall live with you.” This obligation includes saving his life, providing medical care, and granting full social support, such as charity. Ramban even counts supporting a ger toshav as a distinct positive commandment.[5]
Avodah Zarah 64b records three tannaitic opinions defining a ger toshav:
- Me’ir: one who pledges before a beit din to abstain from idolatry.
- The Sages: one who accepts the Seven Noahide laws.
- Aherim: one who observes all Torah commandments except the prohibition against eating neveilah (carrion).
In contrast, non-Jews who do not qualify as either ger tzedek or ger toshav may not reside in the Land of Israel.[6] They are also subject to several restrictions derived from lo tehanem (literally, “give them no quarter”) (Devarim 7:2), including prohibitions against showing them favor, praising them, selling them land, or giving them gratuitous gifts.[7] Rambam expands this further, ruling that one must prevent the expansion of idolatrous settlement and, when Israel exercises full sovereignty, even reduce it.[8] Further, Rambam applies the prohibition of “You shall not make a covenant with them” (Devarim 7:2) beyond the Seven Nations, applying it to covenants with any idolaters.[9]
Rishonim
In a comprehensive study of the topic, R. Elisha Aviner identifies four major approaches among the rishonim regarding the definition and status of the ger toshav: those of Rambam, Ramban/Ritva, Tosafot, and Ra’avad.[10]
Rambam defines a ger toshav as a non-Jew who has “accepted upon himself not to worship idols along with the other mitzvot that the Noahides were commanded to observe.”[11] He requires not only acceptance of the Seven Noahide Laws but also that this acceptance be made before a beit din.[12] Moreover, Rambam distinguishes between a non-Jew who observes the Noahide Laws out of moral conviction—who is praiseworthy and called “wise among the nations”—and a ger toshav, who must accept those laws specifically because God commanded them through Moses. Thus, a morally upright non-Jew who follows the laws on rational grounds does not become a ger toshav unless he accepts them formally with the motivation Rambam requires.[13]
Both Ramban and Ritva delineate three categories: (1) a ben noah (a Noahide), (2) a full ger toshav, and (3) a kuti (a non-Jew who does not keep the Seven Noahide Laws). A full ger toshav accepts the Seven Laws before a beit din and is granted residence in the Land of Israel with certain social protections. A ben noah keeps the laws out of personal conviction but has not accepted them before a beit din; such a person may be morally praiseworthy but does not qualify halakhically as a ger toshav. A kuti rejects the commandments or serves foreign gods.[14] Rambam likewise implies an intermediate category—those who are Noahides or “wise among the nations” but not gerim toshavim—though he does not fully elaborate its legal significance.
Tosafot offer a different view: they recognize only two states—an idolater and a non-idolater who is treated as a ger toshav.[15] According to Tosafot, even a non-Jew who has not formally accepted the laws before a beit din but who lives morally and refrains from idolatry may be regarded as a ger toshav.
There is also an early dispute about whether the ger toshav institution can function today. Arakhin 29a records: “Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: ‘There is no ger toshav except when the Jubilee is in effect.’” Rambam rules similarly: “We do not accept a ger toshav unless the Jubilee year is observed.”[16] Thus, even if a non-Jew today accepted the Seven Laws in the proper manner, he could not be halakhically recognized as a ger toshav while the institution is suspended. Ra’avad, however, objects to Rambam’s absolute formulation. He maintains that, while the full legal benefits of a ger toshav depend on the Jubilee, the right to reside in the Land of Israel may still be granted to a ger toshav even when the Jubilee is not observed.[17]
Position of R. Yosef Karo
R. Yosef Karo argues that Rambam and Ra’avad are not truly in conflict. His Kesef Mishneh commentary reads Ra’avad as explicating Rambam: both agree that a non-Jew who observes the Seven Noahide Laws but has not formally accepted them before a beit din—even when the Jubilee is not in effect—has a partial ger toshav status and may be permitted to reside in the Land of Israel, although he lacks the full halakhic entitlement.[18]
R. Yosef Karo rules elsewhere, however, that Muslims do not have the halakhic status of ger toshav, because they have not accepted the Seven Noahide Laws before a beit din, despite generally observing those laws in practice.[19] In his Beit Yosef he likewise maintains that the prohibition against giving free gifts (lo tehanem) applies to Muslims, whereas it does not apply to genuine gerei toshav.[20]
Heter Mekhirah and Rav Kook
When Jews began to repopulate the Land of Israel in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, they were faced with considerable difficulties in establishing agricultural settlements. Many of the settlers were concerned that observing the rigorous restrictions of shemittah would force the settlements to collapse or even lead to starvation.[21] In response to these concerns, R. Yisrael Yehoshua of Kutna permitted the temporary sale of land in Israel to non-Jews as a means of allowing agricultural work during shemittah and thereby protecting the fragile new communities.[22] This leniency—later known as the heter mekhirah—was eventually supported by the then-posek ha-dor (decisor of the generation), R. Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor.[23]
In contrast, R. Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin (Netziv) strongly opposed selling the land. He argued that the sale replaced a relatively minor rabbinic prohibition of contemporary shemittah with the far more serious biblical prohibition of lo tehanem.[24]
R. Avraham Yitzhak Kook, Chief Rabbi of the Land of Israel at the time, offered an innovative approach. He maintained that people whose religious identity rejects idolatry should be treated de facto as gerei toshav.[25] For him, Islam’s strong anti-idolatry stance functions as the practical equivalent of accepting the Seven Noahide Laws before a beit din. Based on this reasoning, Rav Kook held that in a she’at ha-dehak, selling land to Muslims is halakhically permissible and even necessary to prevent the collapse of the new agricultural settlements.[26]
Rav Kook’s halakhic position in this area reflects the broader universalistic themes that pervade his hashkafic (philosophical) writings, in which he expresses notably positive views of non-Jewish religions.[27] He writes that religions which emerged from Judaism—namely Christianity and Islam—should be accorded respect, as they elevate humanity to a higher level of moral refinement and enable their adherents to serve God according to their spiritual level.[28] Furthermore, he states that the founders of Christianity and Islam were divinely inspired and may have been able to perform miracles.[29] Similarly, Rav Kook states that once idolatry is stripped from Christianity, Jesus will be able to be seen in a positive light.[30] Rav Kook maintains that non-Jewish religions untainted by idolatry constitute authentic, divinely inspired paths, and therefore their adherents are not required to abandon them.[31] It is thus unsurprising that Rav Kook significantly broadened the halakhic concept of ger toshav beyond the parameters articulated by earlier posekim.
Contemporary Opinions
One of the earliest halakhic authorities to address the rights of non‑Jewish citizens after the founding of the State of Israel was R. Yehuda Gershuni.[32] Following his teacher Rav Kook,[33] R. Gershuni argued that minority rights in Israel derive from the status of ger toshav (resident alien), a category that obligates Jews to sustain and heal the ger toshav—even without payment. He concluded that this obligation requires granting full rights to Muslim residents of Israel. R. Gershuni did not address the status of Christians or Druze.
R. Eliezer Melamed likewise supports granting minority rights based on the category of ger toshav, but he distinguishes between communities.[34] He argues that Christians in Israel are closer to qualifying as gerim toshavim than Muslims, while most Druze—who, he contends, observe the Seven Noahide Laws, acknowledge the Jewish people’s claim to the land, and have supported Israel in wartime—should be regarded as definitive gerim toshavim. By contrast, he notes that many Muslims do not observe the Seven Noahide Laws, making it difficult to determine how many Arabs between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean qualify as gerim toshavim. R. Melamed raises practical concerns about applying ger toshav status or creating exceptions to lo tehanem in light of violent terror within parts of the Muslim community. By contrast, Rav Kook grounds his lenient approach primarily on Islam’s categorical rejection of paganism rather than on full observance of all Noahide Laws;[35] for Rav Kook, high rates of violence in the community would not automatically revoke ger toshav status or trigger lo tehanem.
R. Shlomo Goren ruled that Rav Kook’s approach treats all Muslims as gerim toshavim and that this view is the binding precedent of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate in this matter.[36] He conditions this status on adherence to the Seven Noahide Laws and rules that anyone who supports or sympathizes with terror forfeits the status and may be expelled according to Halakhah. R. Tzvi Yehuda Kook qualified his father’s position by emphasizing that, while Arabs in Israel must be treated with full human dignity and fairness as individuals, national and political sovereignty in Israel belongs exclusively to the Jewish people.[37]
R. Shaul Yisraeli and R. Yitzhak Isaac Ha-Levi Herzog
Contrastingly, R. Shaul Yisraeli takes a strict halakhic position: non-Jews living in the modern State of Israel are not automatically entitled to citizenship rights unless they hold the status of ger toshav.[38] He notes that, according to Rambam, one attains ger toshav status only by accepting the Seven Noahide Laws before a beit din during a period when the Jubilee is observed; because the Jubilee is not currently in effect, the category does not apply today.
Nonetheless, R. Yisraeli recognizes the present reality in which “Jewish sovereignty is not absolute.” For that reason, he argues that non-Jews in the Land of Israel should be afforded rights on the basis of the classical halakhic principles of eivah (avoiding enmity) and darkhei shalom (promoting peaceful relations). Thus, while he rejects a formal, ideal framework for extending citizenship to non-Jews, he invokes these practical principles to justify their civil recognition.
Similarly, R. Yitzhak Isaac Ha-Levi Herzog, the first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of the State of Israel,[39] maintained that the laws of ger toshav alone do not provide a sufficient halakhic foundation for granting civil rights to non-Jews.[40] Although he regarded most non-Jewish residents as gerim toshavim or, at minimum, Noahides, he argued that Israel’s commitment to democracy and equal rights—conditions tied to international acceptance of the State—creates a binding obligation to uphold those rights. Herzog held that, by accepting the United Nations’ requirement to function as a liberal democracy, Israel incurred a duty to honor that commitment;[41] his reasoning effectively extends the principle of dina de-malkhuta dina (the law of the land is binding) to the international obligations the State accepted.[42]
R. Hayyim David Ha-Levi, the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, went further, advocating full equal rights for all citizens on the basis of universal moral obligation.[43] He wrote that contemporary non-Jews are not to be treated as idolaters, and therefore—even if Israel possessed the full halakhic sovereignty of ancient times—there would be no basis to treat them as such. Consequently, relations between Jews and non-Jews—whether between the State and its non-Jewish citizens or between individuals—should not be maintained merely “for the sake of peace.” Rather, because non-Jews are no longer classified as idolaters according to Halakhah, obligations such as supporting livelihoods, visiting the sick, burying the dead, and comforting mourners (see Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 151:12) should be performed out of moral duty, not merely for pragmatic considerations.
- Yehuda Amital similarly grounded minority rights in moral and religious principles.[44] He identified five foundations for granting civil rights to minorities:
- Image of God—All human beings are created in the image of God (Avot 3:14).
- Emulating God’s Attributes—“The Lord is good to all” (Psalms 145:9).
- Halakhic Values—Halakhah requires conduct characterized by pleasantness and peace toward others based on the verse “Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace” (Proverbs 3:17).
- Universal Mission—The Jewish people are to be a light unto the nations.
- Sanctification of God’s Name and Avoiding Its Desecration—Violating minorities’ civil rights risks desecrating God’s name, especially given the State’s Declaration of Independence.
R. Amital invoked Rambam (Hilkhot Melakhim 6:3–4) and Radbaz (in his commentary ad loc.), who derive from the story of the Gibeonites (Joshua 9) that deceiving or breaking a covenant after peace has been made is forbidden and constitutes a desecration of God’s name.[45]
Similarly, R. Isser Yehuda Unterman, who succeeded R. Herzog as Chief Rabbi of Israel, argued that saving non-Jewish lives on Shabbat is not merely a pragmatic concession for the avoidance of enmity (mi-shum eivah) but flows directly from the Torah’s moral foundations.[46] He emphasized that darkhei shalom (ways of peace) are not optional acts of kindness but binding halakhic principles rooted in Torah ethics.
R. Eliezer Shimon Rosenthal interpreted R. Unterman’s position as a necessary halakhic development following the establishment of the State of Israel. He described it as an integration of the principle of derekh eretz kadmah la-Torah (basic human decency precedes Torah) into halakhic decision-making, arguing that failure to adopt this approach would undermine both Torah morality and the survival of Jewish society. In a Jewish state where Jews and non-Jews live side by side, Halakhah must affirm the equal value of all human life.[47]
By contrast, Rav Shagar addresses the rights and recognition of non-Jewish minorities through a postmodern theological lens. He reframes Jewish identity and nationalism around the concept of home-ness rather than exclusionary nationalism, emphasizing rootedness without imposing beliefs on others and thereby fostering openness and coexistence.[48] For Rav Shagar, pluralism is not merely a political necessity but a religious imperative: he urges holding nationalism and universality together, creating a space that respects particularity while affirming shared humanity.[49]
Rav Shagar avoids the halakhic impasse over ger toshav and lo tehanem by insisting that Jews retain a sense of exile alongside sovereignty—borrowing, in part, from Haredi critiques of triumphalism.[50] He warns against a “victor mentality,” calling instead for humility in sovereignty and a continual remembrance of historical vulnerability. He points to the biblical and talmudic image of Jerusalem as a model: a city that embodies apparent contradictions—national and universal, local and global—and thus can unite Jewish particularity with a vision of global peace through spiritual transformation. In Rav Shagar’s view, a multicultural democracy that honors multiple voices and traditions is the proper framework for Israeli society; the rights of non-Jews are grounded in the very structure of the state as he conceives it.[51]
Halakhah Le-Ma’aseh:
R. Ido Rechnitz, in his review on the subject, concludes that contemporary halakhic authorities generally agree: in the modern State of Israel, a single legal framework should apply to all citizens—Jews and non-Jews alike—and non-Jewish minorities should receive the same civil rights as the Jewish majority.[52] The only major difference among the posekim is, as we have seen, the halakhic basis for this approach.
Based on the widely held pesak (ruling) of civic equality, the Beit Hillel rabbinic organization endorses the following positions with regard to military burial, employment, and housing:[53]
- Burial of Non-Jewish Soldiers: Although Jewish tradition generally separates Jewish and non-Jewish burial, there is a strong halakhic basis to permit burying a non-Jewish soldier who gave his life for Israel alongside Jewish comrades in a military cemetery, as is the approach of the Chief Rabbinate of the IDF.[54] This is because it is unthinkable to define a non-Jewish soldier who sacrificed their life for the Jewish people as “wicked” (which is the basis for the original prohibition). Moreover, such burial strengthens the unity and morale of the IDF and, as such, can be considered a form of pikuah nefesh (preservation of life).
- Employment and Economic Relations: There is a halakhic preference to prioritize Jewish employment and commerce (Avodah Ivrit) on an individual level. However, the State has an obligation—whether based on ger toshav, darkhei shalom, concern for enmity, or basic morality—to ensure that non-Jewish citizens can earn a dignified livelihood. Furthermore, individuals are required to cooperate with State policies that ensure such equality.
- Housing (Selling and Renting): Although the Torah prohibition of lo tehanem seems to prohibit granting land to non-Jews, there are several mitigating factors, as discussed above. A lease is generally permissible because it is temporary and the land remains under Jewish ownership. However, the case of selling is a matter of significant debate among the posekim. Nevertheless, many contemporary authorities are lenient, especially regarding buyers who believe in a single God (monotheists), in order to avoid a hilul Hashem (desecration of the Name) and international backlash. Nonetheless, each case must be evaluated carefully. Where discrimination could cause hatred or endanger Jews worldwide, leniency may be warranted. Conversely, where granting property could create security risks or strengthen hostile elements, restriction may be required.
In an issue of the Tzohar journal, R. Benayahu Brunner, a dayyan and president of the Tzfat Hesder Yeshiva, proposed a framework for integrating non-Jews into Israel’s civic life while preserving its Jewish character.[55] He stresses that minority rights should be logically linked to corresponding obligations and tailored to minorities’ distinct circumstances. For example, halakhic authorities have permitted non-Jews to serve as ministers, though participation in decisions of war and peace might reasonably depend on the minister’s family members serving in the IDF. Zionist considerations may justify limiting Arab land purchases in Jewish communities, provided that the State supplies adequate nearby housing and, where appropriate, invokes leniencies regarding lo tehanem. Minorities should retain access to education and higher learning. National service should be mandated for minorities with attendant benefits, without conditioning basic civil rights on service or using it as a loyalty test.
R. Elisha Aviner has ruled that monotheistic minorities in the State of Israel should be treated as members of the intermediate halakhic category between idolater and ger toshav.[56] As such, non-Jews living in the State of Israel under Jewish sovereignty are required to accept basic obligations (taxation, loyalty to law, etc.) but are also granted civil rights and protections, especially when doing so promotes peace and stability. Positions of coercive authority (e.g., judge, police commander) should ideally be held by Jews while administrative or technical roles may be filled by non‑Jews. However, R. Aviner concedes that in a modern democratic state, coalition‑building and political necessity may justify broader participation.
Similarly, R. Ya’akov Ariel has distinguished between two categories of public roles. The first includes positions involved in civil decision-making on behalf of all residents; these may be filled by non-Jews because they do not constitute true serarah (sovereign authority).[57] The second involves full governing authority over the State, including political and security decisions; such authority, he argues, may not be entrusted to a non-Jew, based on the commandment to “set over yourself a king from among your own people” (Devarim 17:15). Therefore, non-Jews may be included in a coalition. However, a coalition may not rely on non-Jewish Knesset members for its majority.[58]
In contrast, Rabbis David and Avraham Stav argue that membership in the coalition, in and of itself, does not constitute serarah.[59] A coalition simply reflects that most MKs (members of the Knesset) support the government. Therefore, relying on non-Jewish MKs for a coalition majority does not grant them authority; it only factors their preferences into choosing those who hold authority. As a result, there is no halakhic difference between a non-Jewish MK in the coalition and one in the opposition. The halakhic reasons that permit appointing non-Jews to certain roles—such as darkhei shalom or differing definitions of serarah—also justify relying on them to form a government. Rabbis Stav propose that their opinion is almost explicit in the responsum of R. Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg, who explicitly permitted electing non-Jewish Knesset members even though “at times their vote is the decisive one.”[60] Rabbis Stav state that, for the same reason, a non-Jew may be appointed as a minister as well.
Approach of R. Meir Kahane
R. Meir Kahane famously stated that Arab citizens of the State of Israel should not be eligible for equal rights, including the right to vote, based on a literalist read of Hilkhot Melakhim 8.[61] More recently, this position was reiterated by Rabbis Yitzhak Shapira and Yosef Elitzur in their work, Torat Ha-Melekh.[62] However, R. Yuval Sherlo has pointed out a critical flaw in this argument: it only reads the laws regarding non-Jews in a literalist, fundamentalistic fashion, while all other laws in Hilkhot Melakhim are adapted for the current time period. For instance, if one was to take Hilkhot Melakhim literally, a monarchy should be set up in the State of Israel, or at the very least the opinions of Rav Kook and R. Yosef Hayyim Sonnenfeld should be adopted, ending women’s suffrage.[63] It is intellectually dishonest to assume that the laws regarding relationship to non-Jews should be taken literally, while all other rules in Hilkhot Melakhim need to be adapted to modern times. Similarly, others have pointed out that R. Kahane’s approach is limited by its reliance on too few sources, and that a comprehensive analysis of the full range of halakhic literature would likely yield a different conclusion.[64] Consequently, these approaches have been rejected by all major posekim, with R. Zalman Nehemia Goldberg characterizing the rulings in Torat Ha-Melekh as “incorrect by virtue of the law and also devoid of human reason.”[65]
Conclusion
The question of equal rights for all citizens of the State of Israel is far from a marginal political debate; it represents a profound prism through which to view Halakhah as it encounters Jewish sovereignty in the modern era. From the classical categories of ger toshav and the restrictive boundaries of lo tehanem, through the intricate disputes of the rishonim and the bold, creative rulings of Rav Kook, to the covenantal-democratic vision of Rav Herzog, a clear trajectory emerges.
Whether grounded in the pragmatic frameworks of eivah and darkhei shalom proposed by R. Yisraeli, the moral universalism of R. Hayyim David Ha-Levi, the binding nature of dina de-malkhuta dina, or the foundational axioms of tzelem Elokim and kiddush Hashem, the weight of normative pesak has moved decisively toward the affirmation of civil equality. Contemporary halakhic authorities have largely insisted that the integrity of the Torah is inseparable from the pursuit of justice and civic equity for all who dwell within the Land of Israel.
On a personal note, we must recognize that Israel is an exceptionally integrated society. Our daily lives—our workplaces, our medical clinics, and our local economies—are woven together by Jews and non-Jews serving as colleagues, supervisors, and acquaintances. The past two and a half years of conflict have forced into the open the conflicting narratives held by the different populations sharing this small land.
Examining the idea of medinat kol ezraheha (a state for all its citizens) through the lens of Halakhah offers more than just legal clarity; it provides a moral and spiritual anchor in an otherwise stormy reality.
[1] Adam Schrader, “Majority of Israelis Support Enshrining Full Equality for Non-Jewish Citizens,” United Press International, November 26, 2023; Masha Gessen, “How a Palestinian/Jewish Village in Israel Changed After October 7th,” The New Yorker, June 10, 2024.
[2] Mohammad Darawshe, “A Jewish Nation-State Can Also Be a Nation of All Its Citizens” [Heb.], The Jewish People Policy Institute, May 3, 2024.
[3] See Eli Hadad, “Judaism Meets Israeliness: Between Israel and the Nations: The Relation to Minorities in Israel” [Heb.], YouTube video published by Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Jewish Studies, January 5, 2025.
[5] Ramban, Hasagot to Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, Positive Commandments Omitted by Rambam, no. 16.
[6] Rambam, Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, Negative Commandment 51; Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 10:6.
[7] Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 10:1–4.
[9] Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 10:1. On a simple level, Devarim 7:2 commands that the Seven Nations of Canaan be eradicated—“You shall utterly destroy them.” A discussion about the laws and ethics of the commandment to destroy the Seven Nations is beyond the scope of this article. For a nuanced discussion, please refer to R. Ya’akov Medan’s article: “The Question of Conquering the Land in Light of Moral Values: A Reflection on the Book of Joshua,” reprinted in his book, The Renewed Scriptures: Studies in Prophets and Writings [Heb.] (Tvunot, 2015). See also his lecture on the subject, “The Torah’s Commandment for Conquest of the Land and the Humanistic Problem” [Heb.], Torat Har Etzion, July 25, 2017.
[10] R. Elisha Aviner, “The Status of the Ishmaelites in the State of Israel According to Halakhah” [Heb.], Tehumin 8 (1987).
[11] Hilkhot Issurei Bi’ah 14:7.
[12] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:10–11.
[13] It should be noted that, in many printed editions, the text of this halakhah is written as: “However, if he fulfills them [the Noahide Laws] out of intellectual conviction, he is not a resident alien, nor of ‘the pious among the gentiles,’ nor of their wise men.” However, manuscript analysis reveals that this reading is incorrect and that the original and correct text is: “However, if he fulfills them [the Noahide Laws] out of intellectual conviction, he is not a resident alien, nor of ‘the pious among the gentiles,’ but rather from their wise men.” See: R. Ohad Fixler, “A Resident Alien, a Righteous Person Among the Nations, and a Wise Person Among the Nations” [Heb.], Torat Har Etzion, March 10, 2017.
[14] Ramban to Makkot 9a; Ritva to Makkot 9a, s.v. “alma ger toshav kuti hu.”
[15] Tosafot to Avodah Zarah 64b, s.v. “eizehu ger toshav.”
[16] Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 10:6.
[17] Ra’avad to Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 10:6, s.v. “aval she-lo bi-zman ha-yovel ein mekabelin ela ger tzedek bilvad.”
[18] Kesef Mishneh to Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 10:6, s.v. “katav ha-Ra’avad aval she-lo bi-zman ha-yovel.”
[19] Kesef Mishneh to Hilkhot Ma’akhalot Asurot 11:7, s.v. “ger toshav ve-hu she-kibel alav sheva mitzvot etc.”
[20] Beit Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat 249:2.
[21] See Shira Freed, “The Rabbis of Jerusalem and Its Zealots in the Shemittah Controversy of 5649” [Heb.], Iyunim: Multidisciplinary Studies in Israeli and Modern Jewish Society 41 (2024): 147–170; Asaf Yedidya, Halakha and the Challenge of Israeli Sovereignty (Lexington Books, 2019), 20–26.
[22] Responsa Yeshu’ot Malko, Yoreh De’ah 55 (written in anticipation of shemittah 5649 [1888–1889]).
[23] Dr. Marc Shapiro, “Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor,” Jewish History Uncensored (Torah in Motion podcast).
[24] Teshuvot Meshiv Davar 2:56.
[25] Responsa Mishpat Kohen 58, 61 (written in anticipation of shemittah 5670 [1909–1910]).
[26] This logic reinforces the rationale of R. Yehoshua of Kutna that the sale is temporary and that its purpose is to preserve Jewish settlement and agriculture.
[27] See Marc B. Shapiro, “Study of Kabbalah; Other Religions,” in Renewing the Old, Sanctifying the New: The Unique Vision of Rav Kook (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2024), 130–155.
Those religious which have branched off on their own, it would not be appropriate to view the [sic] with an “evil eye.” … The underlying conviction in the books of those Christian and Muslim religions is that the value of Judaism has already become void, God forbid. That [idea] must be nullified in order to enable humanity to come to its eternal purpose and goal. But the ethical content in [those books], however, which any religion has, to understand and to improve, those [ideals] are things that are proper to honor, and it’s proper for anyone with a perfected mind to understand that when they involve themselves in the ethics they have in their hands, they are involved in doing God’s work according to their level. Behold, the bottom line is that all moral betterment will cause a person the possibility of getting closer to the more exalted ethical end-goal, and lifting up the collective. (Sefaria Community Translation; emphasis added)
It’s possible that the founders [of those religions which have branched off] had a divine idea for them to strive to improve a portion of the impressionistic portion of humanity however much they could. For this purpose, it is possible that some perceptible wonders were prepared for them, if they needed to strengthen [their messages], since this is relevant to humanity’s improvement, for the hand of God stretches from the beginning of existence to the end.
[30] Iggerot Ha-Ra’ayah 4:1276.
[31] Le-Nevukhei Ha-Dor 52:3 (my translation):
But regarding those faiths that have adopted a conception of the existence of the absolute Unity of Hashem, may He be blessed, there is no compelling reason for them to leave the framework of their religion. They can forever remain within it with a broad mind, and even with absolute piety. This is the arising foundation of the doctrine of tolerance within the Torah of Truth, which decreed that “even a gentile who engages in Torah is like a High Priest,” and that “even a gentile, a manservant, or a maidservant—everyone according to their actions, the Divine Inspiration rests upon them.” (emphasis added)
It should be noted that Rav Kook was not a religious/moral relativist in that he did see Judaism as the true and supreme religion. See Orot, Yisrael, U-Tehiyato 5. See also Marc B. Shapiro, “Study of Kabbalah; Other Religions,” in Renewing the Old, Sanctifying the New: The Unique Vision of Rav Kook (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2024), 133.
[32] R. Yehuda Gershuni, “Minorities and Their Rights in the State of Israel According to Halakhah” [Heb.], Tehumin 2 (1981): 180.
[33] R. Gershuni was a student of R. Shimon Shkop and studied in Jerusalem under Rav Kook. R. Gershuni asserted how deeply impressed he was by Rav Kook’s personality and ideas. See Yitzhak Goldshlag, “R. Yehuda Gershuni: The Genius from Grodno” [Heb.], Ha-Tzofeh, August 15, 1958.
[34] Peninei Halakhah, The Nation and the Land 5:2, “The Halakhah’s Attitude Toward Residence of Arabs in the State of Israel” [Heb.].
[35] Responsa Mishpat Kohen 58.
[36] Peninei Halakhah, The Nation and the Land, appendix, “Responsa of R. Goren,” no. 3 [Heb.].
I assume Rav Goren is stating this as the official stance of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate as Rav Melamed—then serving as secretary of the Organization of Rabbis of Yesha—directed these inquiries to Rav Goren for a formal ruling, prompting Rav Goren to express astonishment that anyone would still question the matter after Rav Kook had already ruled on it.
[37] As quoted by R. Elisha Aviner, “The Status of Ishmaelites in the State of Israel” [Heb.], Tehumin 8 (1987): 337.
[38] R. Shaul Yisraeli, Amud Ha-Yemini, siman 12 (Makhon Ha-Torah Ve-HaMedinah, 2000).
[39] Rav Kook passed away before the establishment of the State of Israel.
[40] R. Yitzhak Isaac Ha-Levi Herzog, Israeli Legislation According to the Torah, vol. 1 [Heb.] (Mossad Harav Kook, 1989), 12–21.
[41] In his essay, R. Herzog states (my translation):
We have not conquered, up to this point, nor could we have conquered the Land against the will of the United Nations. It is only by their consent. And there is no doubt that until the coming of our righteous Messiah, we will need their protection against the sea of political enemies surrounding us, whose reach will extend even into the State itself. …
We have been given the possibility of receiving from the nations the authority to establish a Jewish state in the Land of Israel—but on the condition that we tolerate people of another religion, even idol worshipers (provided that their worship does not undermine general morality or the moral law), who will reside in our land and maintain their religious rites. And at any rate, if they accept the citizenship of the Jewish state, they will not be denied the right to purchase land and immovable property. … However, we do not even need these leniencies [of eivah]. …
These commandments [lo tehanem] … were originally imposed only upon the Jewish people when they themselves conquered the Land and received sovereignty independently, without regard for the nations. This is the background in the Torah for those commandments, and the plain meaning of the matter speaks for itself.
Therefore, in light of this background, and under conditions in which the State is granted on such terms, those commandments simply do not apply, just as they do not apply in the Diaspora, or even in the Land of Israel when we do not hold sovereign power. And has anyone ever said that it is forbidden for us to live in the Land of Israel when the nations hold power … for since we are not given the ability to establish the Hebrew state except under such conditions, in such a case we were not commanded, and there is no commandment here and no transgression here.
[42] R. Herzog’s approach to granting civil rights to non-Jews is comparable to the way R. Shaul Yisraeli applied the principle of dina de-malkhuta dina to prohibit the deliberate targeting of noncombatants during military conflict. See Amud Ha-Yemini, siman 16, 130–139.
[43] R. Hayyim David Ha-Levi, “Paths of Peace in Relations Between Jews and Non-Jews” [Heb.], Tehumin 9 (1988): 71–81.
[44] R. Yehuda Amital, “The Attitude Toward Minorities According to the Torah in the State of Israel” [Heb.], Daf Kesher 200 (5750 [1990]): 340–43.
[45] Although R. Amital did not explicitly address the issue of state support for non-Jewish religions, his co-rosh yeshivah, R. Aharon Lichtenstein, did (“The Pope’s Visit” [Heb.], Daf Kesher 752 [5760 (2000)]; my translation):
…The public strengthening of Christianity in the Holy Land—symbolized by the Pope’s visit—introduces an element of spiritual defilement. The concern is heightened by the fact that the State of Israel helps fund the Pope’s large public Mass, thereby becoming an active participant in the event, which raises serious reservations. … However… Despite the severity of idolatry, distinctions must be made among different forms of it. The idolatry prevalent in biblical times—such as Moloch worship—was associated with extreme immorality, bloodshed, and the degradation of human dignity. In comparison, Christianity represents a significant moral and spiritual advance toward ethical monotheism. Although it constitutes “association” [of another entity with God], it is far more refined than ancient paganism. One may even be grateful that, among the many religions and cults circulating in the ancient Near East, Christianity—arguably the most spiritually elevated—became dominant. Christianity is built upon a profound spiritual worldview. Although Judaism fundamentally disagrees with it, its spiritual contribution deserves recognition, as Rambam notes at the end of Hilkhot Melakhim. … If we were to ask whether it is better for a gentile to be an atheist or a worshiper of Moloch, it is clear that the former is preferable; however, if we were to ask simultaneously whether it is better for him to be an atheist or a Christian, it is clear that the latter is preferable. It is said of one of the Gerrer rebbes that while traveling in a carriage, he discovered the driver was an atheist and not, as he had previously thought, a Christian—at which point he insisted on getting out of the carriage.
[46] Shevet Mi-Yehudah 3:70.
[47] R. Rosenthal’s opinion was first voiced publicly at the 1966 founding conference of the Movement for Torah Judaism. It was later published and analyzed by R. Dr. Binyamin Lau in “A Reflection of Truth: The Rabbinate and the Academy in the Writings of A. S. Rosenthal on Violating the Sabbath to Save Gentile Life,” Meorot 10 (Tevet 5773 [2012]).
[48] R. Shagar, Broken Vessels: Torah and Religious Zionism in a Postmodern Environment [Heb.] (Yeshivat Siach Yitzchak, 2003), 91; R. Shagar, The Remainder of Faith [Heb.] (Resling, 2015), 121–22.
[49] R. Shagar, The Remainder of Faith, 77–78.
[50] R. Shagar, On That Day: Sermons and Articles for the Occasions of Iyyar [Heb.] (Makhon Kitvei Ha-Rav Shagar, 2012), 342.
[51] Gili (Mivtzari) Zivan, “Rav Shagar’s Thought as a Basis for Multicultural Democracy” [Heb.] (Israel Democracy Institute, 2019).
[52] Ido Rechnitz, A State According to Halakhah: A Jewish Approach to the Challenge of Independence [Heb.] (Maggid Books and Makhon Mishpetei Eretz, 2018), 215.
[53] “The Attitude Toward Members of Other Nations Living in the State of Israel” [Heb.], Beit Hillel, July 11, 2018.
[54] Ze’ev Weitman, “Strengthening the Military Rabbinate” [Heb.], Shabbat, Makor Rishon, Oct. 11, 2013.
[55] R. Benayahu Brunner, “The Status of Minority Populations in the State of Israel According to the Torah” [Heb.], Tzohar 36 (2009).
[56] R. Elisha Aviner, “The Status of Ishmaelites in the State of Israel” [Heb.], Tehumin 8 (1987): 337.
[57] R. Ya’akov Ariel, “The Participation of Non-Jews in Governance in the State of Israel” [Heb.], Tehumin 43 (2023): 129–140.
[58]As a parliamentary democracy, Israel’s executive branch (the government) is formed by the political party or coalition that commands a majority in its 120-seat legislature, the Knesset. Citizens vote for parties rather than individual candidates, and seats are distributed proportionally among parties crossing the 3.25% electoral threshold. The president then tasks a member of Knesset (MK)—typically the leader of the largest party—with assembling a government, which requires a vote of confidence from a majority of the Knesset (at least 61 MKs) to take office.
MKs who vote to install and uphold the government form the “coalition,” while the remaining lawmakers make up the “opposition.” Coalition partners generally secure ministerial positions, committee chairmanships, and specific legislative or financial benefits for their constituents—privileges denied to the opposition.
The government’s survival depends entirely on maintaining its majority. If a single party or faction within the coalition holds enough seats to reduce the government’s support below 61, it wields immense leverage; if its members vote with the opposition on a motion of no confidence, the government falls. Conversely, if a coalition party lacks the numbers to single-handedly strip the government of its 61-seat majority, the executive does not rely on it for its baseline survival. See Prof. Ofer Kenig, “Everything You Need to Know About How a Government is Formed Following Elections,” Israel Democracy Institute, April 15, 2026.
[59] R. David Stav, “Appointing Non-Jewish Ministers” [Heb.], Tehumin 45 (2025): 242–247; R. Avraham Stav, Facebook post, February 20, 2026.
[60] Responsa Tzitz Eliezer, Hilkhot Medinah, part 1, 3:6.
[61] See R. Irving (Yitz) Greenberg vs. R. Meir Kahane, public debate at the Hebrew Institute of Riverdale, 1988, video, Youtube.
[62] (The Torah Institute next to Yeshivat Od Yosef Chai, 2009).
[63] See Rav Kook, “Al Behirat Nashim A,” Ma’amarei Ha-Ra’ayah; Shlomo Zalman Sonnenfeld, Guardian of Jerusalem: The Life and Times of Rabbi Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, adapted by Hillel Danziger (Mesorah Publications, 1983), 349–384.
[64] See, e.g., this podcast interview of R. Dr. Binyamin Lau. It should be noted that the criticism regarding limited use of sources does not apply to Rabbi Kahane’s student, Dr. Michael Ben Ari.
[65] Rechnitz, A State According to Halakhah, 215; Kobi Nahshoni, “HaGaRZ”N: I Retract My Endorsement of ‘Laws of Killing a Gentile’” [Heb.], Ynet, December 13, 2009.
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