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PARSHAT BEHAALOTEKHA

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REVIEW OF *ANTISEMITISM: HERE AND NOW*

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Antisemitism,¹ in the last number of years, has been a cause for concern in many European Jewish communities. Many American Jews have been paying attention to the situation in Europe while separating the unsettling European experience from the seemingly calm, accommodating American one. While antisemitism has not been completely absent from the United States in recent years, Americans have become acutely alarmed in just the last (roughly) six months alone.

On the one hand, two shootings in synagogues on Shabbat have made many question their sense of physical security. On the other hand, while not necessarily physically threatening, many American Jews were outraged by remarks made by Congresswoman Ilhan Omar of Minnesota, which many argue carried antisemitic tropes, and the New York Times ran a cartoon in its international edition that most would agree was blatantly antisemitic. There are even more events that when reported, if at all, do not spark the vocal outrage as the most familiar incidences; on May 10, for example, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency's daily briefing featured five stories related to antisemitism around the world that did not necessarily make world headlines. It follows, then, that many American Jews may be newly apprehensive about the Jewish future: is antisemitism on the rise, and should we be alarmed?

¹ I deliberately choose to spell "antisemitism" without the hyphen and in lower case, as Lipstadt does. She explains her rationale in the opening chapters of the book. In brief, Wilhelm Marr (a German antisemite who coined the term to target Jews) spelled it this way, and it remains in lower case without the hyphen in French and Spanish as well. Also, the term "Semitic," with regard to language, refers to a broad category of languages, so "antisemitism" therefore refers to hatred of Jews, not hatred of people who speak Semitic languages (p. 23-24).

Professor Deborah Lipstadt's latest book, [*Antisemitism: Here and Now*](#), predates the events mentioned above, but sets out to grapple with the same type of questions. Its objective is to analyze manifestations of antisemitism around the world, especially in the United States, from the past decade. A professor of Modern Jewish History and Holocaust Studies at Emory University, Lipstadt is famous for the trial in which she successfully defended herself against Holocaust denier David Irving's accusation of libel.

The book is divided into seven parts. First, Lipstadt deals with basic definitions and premises regarding antisemitism, broadly speaking. She sees antisemitism as irrational and based on thinking in the realm of conspiracy theories. Not a new phenomenon, antisemitism can be summarized as "the hatred of a perpetual evil in the world" (i.e. Jews) and "hatred of [Jews] *because* they are Jews."² It is an ideology that is persistent and coherent, yet delusional at the same time.

In the next section, Lipstadt elaborates on the many forms of antisemites and antisemitism that exist today, dividing them into four categories. Antisemites in some cases are, in fact, extremists, as we would expect—and this is at least partially enabled and mainstreamed by the internet. But many are not "extremists," yet they still disseminate stereotypes and may even be "polite" about it; she calls these "the dinner party antisemites."

Other people, including influential politicians, are "antisemitic enablers," meaning they may not themselves harbor antisemitic views, but they enable it within their circles. Still others—"clueless antisemites"—may not even be conscious of the stereotypes they harbor. They might innocently declare that Jews are good at obtaining bargains, not meaning any harm, but nonetheless sharing harmful conceptions of Jewish people at large.

The third section of the book deals with contextualizing antisemitism. In this section, Lipstadt discusses conspiracy theories, the tension

² Deborah Lipstadt, *Antisemitism: Here and Now* (Shoken, 2019), 19.

between white Jews as privileged versus victims, the similarities and differences between antisemitism and other forms of prejudice, and the extent to which we should be worried about these phenomena. Lipstadt consistently underscores the importance of recognizing the fact that antisemitism comes from both left and right, and that both sides have a hard time condemning it. In some cases, as described in the fourth section, people may recognize the harm of antisemitism, but they rationalize extremist acts (especially Islamic extremism) against Jews by somehow blaming Zionism—what she terms a “yes, but” argument.

Furthermore, in the fifth section, Lipstadt explains how antisemitism also appears in the form of Holocaust denial—by some on the right, in the form of Neo-Nazism, and by some on the left, claiming that the victims of the Holocaust are now perpetrators of it or claiming that Jews collaborated with the Nazis. This is, of course, her greatest area of expertise.

In the sixth section, Lipstadt discusses anti-Zionism, particularly on college campuses, focusing especially on the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement. Conversely, while anti-Zionism is often seen as an issue on the left, there are those on the alt-right that hate Jews but love Israel. Much of the alarm regarding antisemitism concerns Europe, and much of this can be attributed to anti-Zionism.³ Finally, Lipstadt concludes with a section cautioning the Jewish community not to persistently view itself as hopeless victims.

Academically Informed yet Accessible

Lipstadt writes the book as if she is corresponding with an archetypal Jewish student, Abigail, and an archetypal non-Jewish colleague, Joe. While Abigail and Joe are fictional characters, they represent individuals with whom Lipstadt has interacted in recent years. In their letters, they turn to Lipstadt seeking insight into phenomena they encounter, how to process, and how to respond to what takes place. This style of correspondence makes the book both very engaging and easy to read. While the author is an academic, the intended audience is not.

A possible drawback to this style is that in responding to Abigail and Joe, Lipstadt is providing her personal analysis, not necessarily a scientific study. The questions posed are both based on and elicit opinion and perspective, so it may not always be easy to distinguish between scholarly consensus and personal judgment. There are not necessarily scientific answers to determine who qualifies as an enabler of antisemitism, the extent to which BDS or Holocaust denial should be fought, or how alarmed one should be by antisemitic events because, when applied in the present situation, personal judgment is involved. This work is Lipstadt’s commentary on current events.

At same time, the give-and-take between Lipstadt, Abigail, and Joe allows the experiences of antisemitism to extend beyond the confines of academic study towards a real, lived, and scary experience. Lipstadt clearly has passion for the subject. Yet, while many people can—and do—comb through the news and put together a narrative of antisemitism with expressed rage, Lipstadt brings expertise to the table as someone who is well versed in the historical discourse on the subject. She admits that her training deals with analyzing past events, not predicting the future, but she provides us

with potential tools from the past that can help us better understand the present.

Before embarking on the heavy analysis of today’s world, Lipstadt discusses the definition of antisemitism and explores different types of antisemites, giving the reader insight on nuances that might otherwise not be considered. Of course, Holocaust denial still exists today, and Lipstadt is able to weave her expertise in this area into the current landscape of antisemitism more broadly.

More important, as a historian looking at the bigger picture, Lipstadt balances passion with measured consideration. One place where this is of great importance is in her analysis of the BDS movement. Is BDS inherently antisemitic? On the one hand, Lipstadt notes that BDS founders were intent on destroying Israel, and she unequivocally states that “the negation of Jewish nationhood is a form of antisemitism, if not in intent, then certainly in effect.”⁴

On the other hand, criticism of Israel is legitimate, and even many Israelis oppose policies of their government (as is likely true in any polity). Furthermore, despite her strong belief that BDS is antisemitic, she notes how some well-intentioned efforts to shut down the movement backfire. For example, by boycotting professors who boycott Israel, some of whom are incorrectly identified as supporters of BDS, one is utilizing the same tactics of BDS proponents. Those involved with Jewish organizations fighting on the front lines may be susceptible to using whatever methods possible to battle BDS, but Lipstadt’s lens as an academic has her take a step back to analyze the cause and effects of various responses.

The book contains footnotes and an index, as any academic book would. Given that this is not a heavy historiographical work, some of the footnotes cite academic writings, but many point to primary sources, such as news articles, op-eds, and videos. Even if some of Lipstadt’s perspectives are personal, the citation of these sources affords the reader the ability to investigate the phenomena on their own and demonstrate that she is not just presenting anecdotal evidence, although she does include a number of (sometimes humorous) anecdotes.

Many of the points Lipstadt makes may seem obvious and straightforward. In discussing current events, she analyzes phenomena that happen right in front of our eyes, and it is not impossible for other people to arrive at her conclusions. But what is significant is that someone who is scholarly and informed on the history of this issue is able to articulate these points. More than the sum total of her points, Lipstadt’s authority emanates from her biography and scholarship. And the reason why the style she employs is important is because antisemitism in the current world must not remain a discussion of the ivory tower.

On the one hand, Lipstadt’s book is an important guide for Jews to understand their own state of affairs today and for communal leaders in guiding their responses to antisemitism and anti-Zionism. On the other hand, the book is even more crucial for those less familiar with antisemitism, and Lipstadt, with her scholarly credentials, plays a crucial role in sharing these perspectives with the world.

³ See the chapter “A Time to Panic?”

⁴ Lipstadt, *Antisemitism*, 178. See also p. 190.

Antisemitism: Related to or Different from Other Forms of Hatred?

A compelling moral component of this book is that Lipstadt is attuned to other forms of oppression in this country and in this world. Hate is not only wrong when it is against the Jews. Yet, championing all other causes *except* for antisemitism, and assuming that all Jews are privileged, is harmful. Antisemitism is surely unique in some ways, and Jews will obviously be extra alert to hatred against themselves. But consider the example of violence African Americans face from police officers. Lipstadt writes:

Fear of violence at the hands of police or being declared “out of place” because one wore a kippah or some other Jewish accoutrement is not a current reality for Jewish Americans. It is precisely because of this that Jews bear a special responsibility to speak out against not only this particular type of prejudice but also against all forms of discrimination. As the victims of prejudice ourselves, we know from personal experience how important it is to have the support of other communities when we fight prejudice against us.⁵

Likewise, from a religious perspective, this issue matters not only because we value *tzelem Elokim* and hold a religious value of compassion for all human beings, but also because if anything, our experiences of antisemitism—of being slaves in Egypt, even—should guide us towards empathy for the plights of other races.⁶

It is important to note that Lipstadt walked the walk on this one in her actions following National Council of Young Israel’s [failure to condemn](#) the Israeli political (religious Zionist) party Bayit Yehudi with post-Kahanist Otzma Yehudit. Lipstadt [resigned](#) from her Young Israel synagogue following this event.⁷ Although I admittedly may not have done the same thing she did, it is noteworthy that the professor fighting antisemitism was also the most vocal in publicly calling out Jewish racism. In an ideal world, Jews care about the safety of others, and others do not minimize our need for safety as well. Indeed, her discussions of the “dinner party” antisemite who “has a best friend who is Jewish” and of the clueless antisemite, versus the extremist, might in turn cause us to be introspective about our own prejudices. Most people I know would not support Jim Crow laws today, but does that make us immune from other forms of prejudice?

But inasmuch as Lipstadt cautions against ignoring hatred against other minorities, she also points to many examples of progressive causes that exclude Jewish students, or make them disavow any form of Zionism. In some cases, those excluding Jews assume that Jews are “white” and have privilege, while ignoring the fact that Jewish communities can feel threatened to the point of feeling the need to hire security guards for synagogues and community centers. Liberal Jews are also asked to choose between their liberal and Jewish identities.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁶ Rabbi Dr. Jeremy Wieder, “[Sensitivity to the World Around Us](#),” *YU Commentator*, December 17, 2014.

⁷ Her synagogue was among several Young Israel synagogues to soon after issue a statement asking the National Council of Young Israel to not make political statements without the consent of member synagogues. The synagogue has since broken away from the Young Israel movement, and Lipstadt rejoined.

In a case from 2015, a Jewish student at UCLA applied to a student judicial board and was asked, during the vetting, how she would commit to maintaining an “unbiased view.” Lipstadt comments, “it’s difficult to believe that had the question been directed to a person of color, or a member of the LGBTQ community, or a woman, the students would have had any trouble recognizing the explicit bias in what was being suggested.”⁸ It also seems that the concept of “safety” applies to many minorities, but not to Jews. In a recent case (after the book was published), Jewish members of the LGBTQ marching in a parade in DC were [asked not to display a flag](#) with a Jewish star.⁹ Whatever the opinion of the Orthodox reader is about pride parades, it should be extremely troubling to all that inclusivity stops with Jews.

The discussion of antisemitism as both a part of general racism and as a uniquely Jewish experience highlights the fact that antisemitism comes from all ends of the political spectrum. While this may seem obvious to many, in an American political climate that is deeply divisive, it is easier to see and call out antisemitism outside of one’s own circles. Much to her credit, Lipstadt adamantly pushes back against this divide with great force. She is deeply concerned about white nationalism/supremacy and antisemitism enabled by the far-right, including supporters of Donald Trump, but she is also deeply concerned with progressive antisemitism, including those in the circles of Jeremy Corbyn in Great Britain, and she deals extensively with anti-Israel initiatives that border on antisemitism. One cannot be concerned about Charlottesville without also taking concern with the affiliations of leaders of the Women’s March with Louis Farrakhan, and vice versa.

Lipstadt acknowledges in her introduction that “some readers may find themselves agreeing with me at one point and being outraged by what I say at another.”¹⁰ But that only highlights the urgency of taking her work seriously. It is at our own peril that we do not consider the broad scope of antisemitism in the world. Instead of just pointing fingers at others, it is also crucial to work within our own circles to do our best to weed out antisemitism. This point is instructive to both politicians as well as to Jewish organizations across the spectrum.

How to React to Antisemitism?

A final theme in the book is how to react to antisemitism. Lipstadt argues that we need to be on guard without allowing fear to spark excessive alarm. She devotes a chapter to discussing the particularly alarming resurgence of antisemitism in Europe. Jews feel unsafe wearing Jewish paraphernalia on the streets, and researchers have seen a normalization of antisemitism that has not occurred since World War II.

Still, Lipstadt denies comparisons to Nazi Germany, “which was state-sponsored antisemitism in which national and local governmental bodies as well as academic institutions enthusiastically participated.”¹¹ There is still good taking place in both Europe and the

⁸ Lipstadt, *Antisemitism*, 94.

⁹ Lipstadt notes a similar case in Chicago from 2017 on p. 198.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, xii.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 109.

United States. She therefore suggests “attention, not panic.”¹² One might expect someone studying antisemitism to panic at every scent of its possible manifestations, but she teaches us to maintain perspective. Her level-headed analysis without avoiding the problems is strongly worth considering.

A similar approach applies to Zionism. Lipstadt spills much ink decrying antisemitism that is disguised as only criticism of the State of Israel. Yet, when we hear critiques of Israel in the news, she argues, we need to not jump to call it antisemitism every time—that can, in fact, backfire. Delegitimizing Jewish peoplehood is antisemitism, but Lipstadt also supports appropriate criticism of Israeli governmental policies when they are wrong. She directs this point especially towards Jewish organizations that are well meaning but sometimes respond counterproductively to such critique.

While being on guard against antisemitism is important, Lipstadt makes it clear that this is not the end-all and be-all of being Jewish. This is highly instructive coming from someone whose lifework is studying and fighting antisemitism. Lipstadt argues that Jews should *do* Jewish and engage with tradition and culture; she expresses her sadness when she encounters those whose only engagement with Judaism is reacting to antisemitism. I find it very powerful that she chose to include this point.

It is an important message to us all that while reactions to antisemitism or the Holocaust may bring us together or serve as a reminder of our Jewish identity, the importance of those reactions is found in our drive to live as Jews in our daily lives. That is why one of the best reactions to the recent horrific shootings in synagogues was to encourage people to [go to synagogue](#) the next week, and hopefully for weeks after. As a rabbi, I hope my congregants will be invested in acting against antisemitism, out of concern for Jewish peoplehood and our own safety. But my deeper aspirations are to convey a passion for and commitment to Judaism that is enriching and compelling on its own terms.

On some level, it is unfortunate this book may have appeal for only a limited amount of time, as it deals with issues that are fairly current. Of course, only time will tell how rapidly the world will change and whether this book will be instructive or whether it will be a useful artifact of antisemitism in the early 21st century. An even more unfortunate reality is that there are more items that became relevant after the book went to press. Her analysis of the shooting in [Poway](#), or remarks by [Rep. Ilhan Omar](#), would have been necessary had this book been published a year later.

Thankfully, the internet will allow Prof. Lipstadt to continue to contribute to this conversation. Ultimately, this book is all too necessary for anyone who is in need of insight or who wishes to discuss the current relationship between the Jewish people and the world around us. Indeed, beyond the need for Jews to read this for self-understanding, we should share this book with those around us who may not grasp the severity of antisemitism today. But, hopefully, we will reach a point at which this book is truly only history, and we will reside in peace with all humankind.

LEVIATHAN: THE HEBREW BEAST AND THE HUMAN MIND

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In modern English, a leviathan is any huge being, man or beast, especially a whale. But the idea of a leviathan has a much richer set of meanings in literary English. Indeed, Melville refers to Ahab’s fatal whale, Moby Dick, as a leviathan, matching the Hebrew-named captain with a beast named in the Hebrew Bible. Thus says Ishmael, *Moby Dick’s* narrator: “When I stand among these mighty Leviathan skeletons, skulls, tusks, jaws, ribs, and vertebrae, all characterized by partial resemblances to the existing breeds of sea-monsters, . . . I am horror-struck at this anti-Mosaic, unsourced existence of the whale, which, having been before all time, must needs exist after all humane ages are over” (104). “Horror-struck,” Ishmael, named after the first-born son of Abraham, acknowledges that the Leviathan has infiltrated and overwhelmed his mind, as was the case for the original Ishmael, who was cast out. His dull physicality prevented him from grasping his father’s covenant, even though Ishmael means “Man of God.”

The “anti-Mosaic” beast to which Ishmael refers appears in the very on the first page of the Five Books of Moses, where it is found among those animals brought forth on the fifth day of creation. This beast is called the *teninim*, in the plural, for in ancient Hebrew the plural is often used to signify immense significance, as in the very name of the Creator, *Elokim*. The renowned eleventh-century commentator, Rashi, identified these “large fish” as the *leviathan*, and this is the term that the knowledgeable King James translators passed on to us, in their well-wrought English.

However, it is not clear what animal the ancient Hebrews had in mind. Perhaps *leviathan* referred to the Egyptian crocodile, perhaps to a rock snake or another terrifying serpent. More importantly, the leviathan’s metaphorical meanings for literate Hebrews far outweighed the heft of the imagined beast. King David’s [Psalm 104](#) draws on resonances deeper than the whale’s wake. “O Lord, how manifold are thy works! In wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches. So is the great and wide sea, wherein are things creeping innumerable, both small and great beasts” (104:24-25). David goes on to liken the endeavors of man to the play of those great beasts in the sea: “There go the ships: there is that leviathan, whom thou hast made to play therein” (104:26). David juxtaposes the builders of ships with the great beast, but what possible connection could they have? What is there about the leviathan that can be compared to shipwrights?

The author of the Book of Job expands on the connection between the leviathan and man. To this poet, the leviathan does not represent a serpent far away in the deeps; rather, it is related to Job’s own impoverished understanding. The Lord admonishes Job for failing to understand the difference between God and the beast. Can Job not distinguish the covenantal God of Abraham from his own bestial thinking? “Canst thou draw out leviathan with a hook or his tongue with a cord which thou lettest down? Canst thou put a hook into his nose? Or bore his jaw through with a thorn? Will he make many supplications unto thee? Will he speak soft words unto thee? Will he make a covenant with thee?” (40:25-28) God seems to have created the beast to remind the “stiff-necked” Hebrews that they cannot reliably forsake their idolatry, their recidivist habit of falling back on the belief in golden calves of all kinds. Does Job know anything about the leviathan in his own mind? Does he know

¹² *Ibid.*, 110.

anything about his repeated inability to distinguish between the Lord who pleads for his people's devotion and the leviathan who can take no interest in him? Even the righteous Job seems to have no ideas about what to make of the beast, even though the beast is himself, sporting a "nose," just like a man.

The prophet warns the children of Israel that their failure to keep the covenant with their God will lead to their destruction. Speaking about the failure of men, the punishment of the Hebrews to the punishment of the leviathan, which serves as an emblem of the wayward Hebrews themselves: "In that day the Lord with his hard and great and strong sword shall punish leviathan, the piercing serpent, even leviathan that crooked serpent; and he shall slay the dragon that is in the sea ([Isaiah 27:1](#)). That sea is the morass of the Hebrew mind, which leads to the Hebrew's inability to recognize that they are chosen only in the sense that they are obligated to choose righteously. The dragon that needs slaying is the Hebrew propensity for idolatry.

The great philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, writing during the English Civil War in the mid-17th century, titled his book on man and society [Leviathan](#), precisely to emphasize the leviathan as a representation not of sea serpents but of man himself, as well as his church, and his larger society. Hobbes' full title goes like this: *Leviathan Or The Matter, Forme, and Power of A Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*.

Because human nature is Hobbes' subject, he begins with a long exploration of the nature of man, his psychology, his passions and his intelligence, finding that the vast complication of the human mind is indeed a leviathan, as are the conglomeration of his religious beliefs and the troubled societies he founds. The leviathan is within us all. This is perhaps best illustrated by the book's frontispiece, which was designed by a Dutch artist under Hobbes' supervision. Boldly presented is the figure of a man, a representation of Mankind as a whole, and, more specifically, a royal figure, supposedly the only one who can, crowned with proper training, harmonize the psychological, spiritual, and social aspects of the human leviathan. This makes Hobbes, incidentally, the founder of the modern, psychological understanding of the human brain as a huge, complex entity, with distinct capacities for multitudinous arts, from armaments to manuscripts to ziggurats:



The need for this hypothetical royal figure to master the human leviathan is best summarized in Hobbes' own, most famous words. The leviathan of mankind, according to Hobbes, is a beast that leads to "war of all against all." "In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." This one sentence is an apt summary of the challenge that faces any Church or King wishing to govern the human mind. Whether or not Hobbes knew how to produce the best Church or King is, perhaps, less important than an agreement on what the search entails.

Do we know how to rule the leviathan in our minds, our churches, and our cities? For Hobbes, the possibility of mankind developing the necessary knowledge rests on the skills given to man by the Creator, who created man in His own image, on the sixth day of creation, the leviathan already present. Man is both created and creative, endowed by his Creator to be so. Man's art imitates God's art, according to Western religion. Thus Hobbes gives us this in his Introduction: "Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governs the World) is by the Art of man and in many other things . . . For by Art is created that great Leviathan called a Common-wealth, or State {which} is but an Artificial Man, . . . for whose protection and defense it was intended; and in which, the Sovereignty is an Artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body."

Writing at the same time as Hobbes, John Milton takes up the challenge to apply artfulness to master the monsters of the mind. In *Paradise Lost*, he likens the Leviathan to Satan, who early in the masterful epic is floating in the ocean that is hell. Satan, no longer an angel in God's heavenly Court, is now a "Sea-beast" with the power to pull any man, or even Mankind in general, into the unforgiving deep.

Thus Satan...
With Head up-lift above the wave, and Eyes
That sparkling blaz'd...
Lay floating many a rood, in bulk as huge
As... that Sea-beast
Leviathan, which God of all his works
Created hugest that swim th' Ocean stream.
(*Paradise Lost* I, 192-201)

Satan may be as "huge" as the Hebrew's mythical and metaphorical "Sea-beast," but it is his evil inclination, rather than his impressive bulk, on which Milton rivets our attention. Satan the Leviathan is emphatically manlike. Just like recalcitrant, sinful men, he has a "mind"; he surveys his new territory like any mindful landowner:

Is this the Region, this the soil, the Clime,
Said then the Lost Arch-Angel, this the seat
That we must change for Heav'n, this mournful gloom
For that celestial light?... Hail horrors, hail
Infernal world, and thou profoundest Hell
Receive thy new Possessor: One who brings
A mind not to be chang'd by Place or Time.
The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.
(*Paradise Lost* I, 242-255)

Milton sees the Leviathan as an important part of the Creation because this “hugest of living creatures” heralds the creation of Man on the sixth day. Though Leviathan be the hugest of living creatures, he is but a mimicry of the grandest of God’s creation, the one gifted with God’s own creativity, with a mind that “is its own place.” Man, with the human capacity for creativity and poetry, is alone capable of understanding the Leviathan as an idea, and only Man is given dominion of the beasts of “Sea and Air.” But to exercise this dominion, Man must master the Leviathan of his own mind.

Thus both Hobbes and Milton elaborate in detail what the Hebrews call the *Yetzer ha-Ra*, the evil inclination of the human mind as it is created. This malevolent capacity of the mind is able to overwhelm the *Yetzer ha-Tov*, that creative part of the mind that is divinely favored. The mind contains the capacity both to mar God’s creation and to draw on the poetry of King David and master the bestial drives of Leviathan.

Milton is emphatic in his support of Christian doctrine, telling us that we will remain lost to the paradise of heaven without the divine intervention of Jesus, but the poet inadvertently hints at the old Hebrew belief that the divinely created mind “Can make Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n,” leaving open the possibility that a God-fearing man might just be able to create a life worth living without the help of “one greater Man.” Thus in the very opening of *Paradise Lost* we find an allusion to both Jesus and Moses:

Of Man’s First Disobedience, and the Fruit
Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal taste
Brought Death into the World, and all our woes,
With loss of *Eden*, till one greater Man
Restore us, and regain the blissful Seat,
Sing Heav’nly Muse, that on the secret top
Of *Oreb*, or *Sinai* didst inspire
That Shepherd [Moses], who first taught the chosen Seed,
In the Beginning how the Heav’ns and Earth
Rose out of *Chaos*.
(*Paradise Lost* I, 1-10)


Nodding to Christian and Hebrew traditions, as well as Greek, with appropriately italicized diction, Milton places the proper use of man’s creativity in spiritual and intellectual capabilities. He uses the capitalized word Man twice, one for the progeny of Adam, the other for that greater Man. In any case, the Leviathan that is Satan is one with the leviathan in the human mind, as seen by Hobbes and Milton, as well as by Isaiah and Job in the Hebrew Bible. That the readers of *Paradise Lost* represent those among mankind who must attend to the leviathan in their own minds is the subject of Stanley Fish’s [Surprised By Sin](#), a marvelous, deeply penetrating reading by my former professor, with whom I studied some fifty years ago.

The author of the Book of Job has God add to His use of the leviathan a portrait of the behemoth (another Hebrew word brought into English by the King-James translators). The two beasts are coupled in adjacent verses, both linked to God’s creativity, but also brought into being along side of man, as if the beasts are one with the bestial part of man. Thus God focuses Job’s attention: “Behold now behemoth, which I made with thee; he eateth grass as an ox. Lo now his strength is in his loins, and his force is in the navel of his belly. He moves his tail like a cedar; the sinews of his stones are wrapped together” (40.15-17). This description of this powerful beast with an animal’s appetite segues immediately into God’s questioning Job

about mortal man’s control over the leviathan: “Canst thou draw out leviathan with an hook?”

The English poet, William Blake, captivated by the poetry of the Book of Job, submitted the whole of it to his own artistic vision. One of his illustrations for the version of Job that he himself published features God creating Leviathan and Behemoth (this word, too, is in the plural, not because it is many but because its meanings are manifold):

Flanked by two cherubs, God creates the behemoth and leviathan over the shoulders of huddling prototypes of mankind. These diminished figures shelter themselves under the canopy of God as they rest on a bubble of bestiality, the latter larger than the former.



There is a fearful symmetry here between divine and human creativity, and between mankind’s cherubic propensities and his animal drives. Blake the poet and artist is the creator of this vision of created man.

Mankind is created in God’s image to be creative, but that creativity thrusts itself into the world with a duality, to which Blake returns in his most famous poem, “The Tyger.”

Tyger tyger! burning bright,
In the forests of the night;
What immortal hand or eye,
Could frame thy fearful symmetry.

In what distant deeps or skies
Burst the fire of thine eyes?
On what wings dare he aspire?
What the hand dare seize the fire?

An what shoulder, & what art,
Could twist the sinews of thy heart?
And when thy heart began to beat,
What dread hand? & what dread feet?

What the hammer: what the chain?
In what durance was thy brain?

What the anvil' what dread grasp
Dare its deadly terror clasp?

When the stars threw down their spears,
And water'd heaven with their tears,
Did he smile his work to see?
Did he who made the Lamb make thee?

Tyger! Tyger burning bright
In the forests of the night,
What immortal hand or eye
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?


Of this poem, the most frequently anthologized of all English poems, much has been said, but let me add that Blake here meditates on God's simultaneous creation of both beauty and evil in a way that fuses God's creation with mankind's sometimes-bestial inventiveness. Blake mixes his diction so that he alludes to the divine (the "immortal" "who made the Lamb," that is Christ), the human ("anvil," "hammer," "chain," "spear", "shoulder," "hand," "smile," "grasp," "clasp"), and the ferocious ("deadly terror").

Some of Blake's phraseology is not clearly pertinent to God, mankind, or beasts. To whom or to what does "What dread hand & what dread feet" refer? To the tyger that thrusts forth paws rather than hands and feet? To God, who needs neither hands nor feet? To the human beings whose hands work with anvils, throw spears, and put others in chains? Why would exercise his creativity in "durance," which is a prison? Is Blake inquiring about divine "art" or human "art," godly "wings" or Icarus-like "wings"? The word "dare" seems appropriately applied to creative men, but Blake uses this verb twice to describe God during His creation of the tyger, even though the depiction of God as a daredevil is sacrilegious. Does the word "sinews" refer only to the tendons of the tyger, or is Blake also alluding to the "sinews" of the behemoth, as described in the King James translation of Job? Does not God say to Job, "I made [the behemoth] with thee"?

Is the fearful symmetry between benevolent creativity and satanic conniving in the tyger's brain, or in God's brain (assuming for the moment that God's creativity arises from a brain), or is it in the human mind? In whose "eye," not in any eye, but specifically in "thine eye," is the fire burning? *Thine* is a word often applied to the divinity, sometimes to a beloved, virtually never to a tiger. And tigers are not usually found "burning bright in the forest of the night." But brutishness does burn bright in the forest of the human brain. Anatomists from Vesalius in Renaissance Italy to Ramon y Cajal in 19th-century Spain illustrated the forests of the human brain. Here is Vesallius' drawing of the brain's tree-like circulation, which Blake, a fair anatomist, would likely have seen:



And here is Ramon y Cajal's meticulous drawing of what he saw through his microscope of the forest in the night of the brain's cortex.



When Blake, Job's illustrator, asks about the tyger's origin, "in what deeps," is he not alluding to the leviathan in its watery depths? And are not those depths in the human mind, too, as the Bible, John Milton, and Thomas Hobbes teach us? Do we not all live with the tyger, the behemoth, and the leviathan in our cranial globe? Galen, the Greco-Roman founder of medical anatomy in the second century, C.E., dissected the brains of Barbary monkeys, finding in the their "little bellies" (for this is the meaning of *ventricles*) sloshing cerebral-spinal fluid, literally the remnant of internalized, archaic seawater, evolved over the ages with ample room for beasts of appetite. These ventricles, in the brain's very center, says Galen, provide the abode of the soul:

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